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Abstract
The provision which is the focus of this Article is article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (”TFEU” or “Treaty”) (formerly article 28 EC). This Article focuses on an
analysis of two recent judgments on this important issue delivered by the European Court of Justice
(”Court”) in 2009, namely the Trailers decision and the Mickelsson decision. Before reaching
these judgments, the Article discusses very briefly the relationship between the four freedoms (free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital) and then, as to the scope of article 34, reminds
the reader of what is ”the story so far.” This story falls neatly into three parts, each beginning with
a seminal judgment: Dassonville, Cassie de Dijon, and Keck. For good measure, this Article will
also consider the principles governing justification under article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC).
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OF TRAILERS AND JET SKIS: IS THE CASE LAW 
ON ARTICLE 34 TFEU HURTLING IN A NEW 
DIRECTION? 
Peter Oliver 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1983 to 1986, I had the very good fortune to work as 
référendaire (legal secretary or, in U.S. parlance, law clerk) to 
Gordon Slynn when he served as Advocate General (“AG”) at the 
European Court of Justice (“Court”). With hindsight, I have 
become aware that this period of my professional life was an even 
more formative experience than I realized at the time. 
Gordon’s sound judicial good sense and foresight continue 
to be a major source of inspiration to me. In addition, among the 
many lessons which I hope to have learned from him was how to 
determine which points should, and which should not, be 
decided in a particular case. Although I have never acted in a 
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, these lessons have served me in 
good stead, not least when appearing before the Court in cases in 
which the European Commission (“Commission”) is effectively 
acting as amicus curiae. I shall return to these points later. 
Before I embark on my topic, it is as well to recall that the 
Treaty of Lisbon came into force on December 1, 2009.1 This 
new treaty has not had a major effect on the area of law covered 
by this Article: it has simply renumbered the provisions in issue 
and effected some minor textual changes without in any way 
 
* Legal Advisor, European Commission, and Professor, Institut d’Etudes 
Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles. The Author wishes to thank Nicolas de 
Sadeleer and Marc Fallon for a most stimulating discussion on these cases, as well as 
Stefan Enchelmaier and Yiannos Tolias. The views expressed here are personal to the 
author. 
1. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1. A consolidated version 
of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”), incorporating the Treaty of Lisbon, was published in 2010 
O.J. C 83/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon], and 2010 O.J. C 83/47, respectively 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
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altering their substance.2 However, it has brought an end to the 
European Community, which merged into the European Union 
(“EU”).3 At the same time, the former Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (“EC Treaty”) has now become the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU” or 
“Treaty”). 
The provision which is the focus of this Article is article 34 
TFEU (formerly article 28 EC). It reads: “Quantitative 
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between Member States.”4 The counterpart to 
this provision is article 35 TFEU (article 29 EC), which prohibits 
quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect on 
exports.5 Not every measure caught by articles 34 or 35 is 
necessarily unlawful: article 36 TFEU (article 30 EC) contains an 
exception to both provisions, since it permits Member States to 
maintain or introduce such measures if they are justified on 
various public interest grounds, including public health.6 The 
substance of these provisions has remained unchanged since the 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community 
first came into force at the start of 1958.7 
The concept of quantitative restrictions on imports under 
article 34 TFEU is very narrow and raises no difficulties. As the 
Court held in Geddo, “the prohibition on quantitative restrictions 
 
2. The consolidated version of the two Treaties prior to the accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania and to the Treaty of Lisbon was published in 2006 O.J. C 321 E/5. The 
consolidated version of the treaties as they stand now supra note 2, contains a table of 
equivalences between pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon numberings. See 2010 O.J. C 83/361. 
3. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 1, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 16. 
4. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 34, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 61. 
5. Id. art. 35, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 61. This provision will only be mentioned in passing 
here. Suffice it to say at this juncture that it has been consistently construed far more 
narrowly than article 34. See Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma v. Asda, Case C-108/01, 
[2003] E.C.R. I-5121, ¶¶ 74–81; Belgium v. Spain, Case C-388/95, [2000] E.C.R. I-3123, 
¶¶ 73–78; Oebel, Case 155/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1993 , ¶¶ 15–16; P.B. Groenveld BV v. 
Produktschap voor Vees en Vlees, Case 15/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3409, ¶ 9; see also FREE 
MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ¶¶ 6.95FF,  7.113FF (Peter Oliver ed., 
Hart Publ’g, 5th ed. 2010); Alexandre Defossez, L’article 29 TCE. Histoire d’une Divergence 
et d’une Possible Réconciliation [Article 29 TCE: History of Conflict and a Possible 
Reconciliation], 45 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 409 (2009) (Fr.). 
6. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 36, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 61. It is always essential to proceed 
in two stages: only if a measure is found to fall within articles 34 or 35 TFEU is it 
necessary to consider whether it is justified under article 36. 
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 30–31, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
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covers measures which amount to a total or partial restriction of 
. . . imports . . . .”8 In contrast, the concept of measures of 
equivalent effect has been the subject of major controversy since 
the very beginning. 
This Article focuses on an analysis of two recent judgments 
on this important issue delivered by the Court in 2009, namely 
the Trailers decision9 and the Mickelsson decision.10 Before 
reaching these judgments, we must first discuss very briefly the 
relationship between the four freedoms, and then, as to the 
scope of article 34, remind the reader of what in the jargon of 
soap operas is known as “the story so far.” This story falls neatly 
into three parts, each beginning with a seminal judgment: 
Dassonville,11 Cassis de Dijon,12 and Keck.13 For good measure, we 
shall also consider the principles governing justification under 
article 36. 
I. FOUR FREEDOMS: CAN THERE BE A UNITARY 
APPROACH? 
Since the early 1990s, a vast body of literature has been 
published on the idea that a unitary approach should be followed 
in relation to all the four freedoms (free movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital).14 Manifestly, unnecessary 
divergences should not be allowed to develop between the 
 
8. Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi, Case 2/73, [1973] E.C.R. 865, ¶ 16. 
9. Commission v. Italy (Trailers), Case C-110/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
10. Åklagaren v. Mickelsson, Case C-142/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-4273). 
11. Procureur du Roi v. Benoît (Dassonville), Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837. 
12. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
13. Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097. 
14. See, e.g., SONJA FEIDEN, DIE BEDEUTUNG DER “KECK”—RECHTSPRECHUNG IM 
SYSTEM DER GRUNDFREIHEITEN [THE MEANING OF “KECK”—IN THE SYSTEM OF 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW] 121 (2003) (F.R.G.); JUKKA SNELL, GOODS AND SERVICES IN EC LAW: 
A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FREEDOMS (2002); Catherine Barnard, 
Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?, 26 EUR. L. REV. 35 (2001); 
David O’Keeffe & Antonio Bavasso, Four Freedoms, One Market and National Competence: In 
Search of a Dividing Line, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 541 (David O’Keeffe ed., 2000); Peter Oliver, 
Goods and Services: Two Freedoms Compared, in 2 MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE MICHEL 
WAELBROECK 1377 (Mariane Dony & Aline de Walsche eds., 1999); D. Martin, 
Discriminations, Entraves et Raisons impérieuses dans le Traité CE: Trois Concepts en Quête 
D’Identité Ière Partie [Discrimination, Barriers and Compelling Reasons in the EC Treaty: Three 
Concepts in Search of Identity Part 1], 34 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 261 (1998) (Fr.). 
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principles governing the various freedoms: they form part of a 
coherent whole and serve the same end; namely, the creation of 
the single market.15 At the same time, certain differences 
between the freedoms are inherent in life and in the treaty. 
For a start, natural persons are not mere economic units and 
must be treated with dignity and proper regard for their families 
and feelings. Consequently, the individual’s right to live and 
work in the country of his choice and not be separated from his 
immediate family cannot be treated on a par with purely 
economic transactions.16 Besides, restrictions on imports of goods 
may take a very wide variety of forms: apart from those which take 
effect at the border, they may be restrictions on sale, “selling 
arrangements,” use, possession, advertising and promotion, and 
so forth.17 The range of restrictions on the other freedoms, 
especially the free movement of natural persons, is more limited. 
Consequently, the scope of article 34 has given rise to greater 
difficulty than that of the corresponding provisions relating to 
the other freedoms. Second, certain key differences between the 
freedoms are spelled out unequivocally in the Treaty.18 Clearly, 
 
15. See, e.g., Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Verkooijen, Case C-35/98 [2000] 
E.C.R. I-4071 (a case on free movement of capital where the European Court of Justice 
(“Court”) based its reasoning on the case law relating to other freedoms); Futura 
Participations SA v. Administration des Contributions, Case C-250/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-
2471 (a case on establishment where the same occurred). The analogy between goods 
and services is particularly close; in Canal Satélite Digital SL v. Adminstración General del 
Estado, Case C-390/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-607, the Court even chose not to decide whether 
the measure in issue constituted a restriction on goods or services. 
16. The Treaty of Maastricht played a key role in raising the status of the free 
movement of natural persons, in particular by the insertion into the Treaty Establishing 
the Eruopean Community (“EC Treaty”) of a series of provisions on citizenship of the 
Union (now article 20 TFEU (formerly article 17 EC)). See Treaty on European Union 
art. G(C), Jul. 29. 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1, at 7. At the same time, it transformed the 
European Economic Community into the European Community, thereby underlining in 
the clearest possible terms that the organization was no longer purely economic in 
nature. Id. art. G(A), 1992 O.J. C 191, at 5. 
17. In addition, restrictions on exports under article 35 may take the form of 
restrictions on production. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 35, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 61. 
18. For example, whereas nationality plays no part in the free movement of goods, 
only nationals of Member States are entitled to provide services pursuant to article 56 
TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 1, art. 56, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 70. Also, unlike its counterparts 
in the other three freedoms, article 63 TFEU is not confined to transactions within the 
internal market but extends to capital transactions with third countries; this is subject to 
article 75 TFEU (formerly article 60 EC). Id. art. 63, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 71. 
  
2010] TRAILERS & JET SKIS: ARTICLE 34 TFEU 1427 
then, any suggestion that the four freedoms have merged into a 
single concept would be untenable.19  
II. THE STORY SO FAR 
A. Scope of Article 34 TFEU 
1. Dassonville 
The judgment in Dassonville was the first ever delivered on 
article 34 TFEU (article 28 EC). In that ruling, the Court set out 
the following definition of measures of equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports: “All trading rules enacted by 
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to 
be considered as measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions.”20 Hundreds of cases have been decided 
on this area of the law in the meantime, and in virtually every one 
this formula has been reproduced, albeit with certain variations;21 
the word “trading” is generally omitted today. 
The striking feature of the Dassonville formula is its 
breadth.22 In particular, it is not necessary to show that a measure 
actually restricts imports, but only that it potentially does so;23 a 
measure which restricts imports only indirectly also falls within 
this definition. Consequently, it is inappropriate to consider 
 
19. Authority for this self-evident proposition may be found in the opinion of 
Advocate General Tizzano, Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 30/01 [2003] E.C.R. I-
9481, ¶ 70. Moreover, there is evidence that the idea of a unitary approach to all four 
freedoms may hold less attraction for the Court than it might once have done. See Judge 
Rosas, Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE 
CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 730 
(Miguel Poaires Maduro & Loic Azoulai eds., 2010). 
20. Dassonville, Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837, ¶ 5. 
21. For instance, the Court has been known to speak of “a direct or indirect, real or 
potential hindrance to imports between Member States.” Rewe-Zentralfinanz eGmbH v. 
Landwirtschaftskammer, Case 4/75 [1975] E.C.R. 843, ¶ 3. Quite exceptionally, the 
Dassonville formula does not appear in Mickelsson. Compare Dassonville, [1974] E.C.R. 837 
with Åklagaren v. Mickelsson, Case C-142/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
22. Nevertheless, restrictions governed by other provisions of the treaty fall outside 
article 34. See De Danske Bilimportører v. Skatteministeriet, Told-og Skattestyrelsen, 
Case C-383/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-6065; Iannelli v. Meroni, Case 74/76, [1977] E.C.R. 557; 
Fink-Frucht v. Hauptzollamt München, Case 27/67, [1968] E.C.R. 223. 
23. For an especially clear illustration of this principle, see Commission v. France, 
Case C-184/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-6197, ¶ 17. 
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statistical evidence as to the volume of imports of products 
subject to the national measure in question: even if imports have 
actually increased since the measure was introduced, they might 
have increased more in the absence of such a measure.24 In other 
words, the Court considers the nature of the measure in question 
without regard to any economic analysis. However, the Court has 
been known to rely on clear evidence that the introduction of a 
measure has caused a dramatic reduction of imports.25 
Another obvious characteristic of the Dassonville formula is 
that it refers exclusively to the effects of a measure, not its 
purpose. That is scarcely surprising: as Picod has pointed out, 
article 34 speaks of “measures of equivalent effect” to 
quantitative restrictions, not “measures of equivalent purpose” to 
quantitative restrictions!26 The overwhelming thrust of the 
subsequent case law confirms this. Although the Court has 
occasionally referred to the purpose of a measure in this 
context,27 it is doubtful if there is a single instance of the Court 
finding a measure to constitute a measure of equivalent effect on 
the basis of its purpose alone, without reference to its effects. 
Within the confines of this Article, it is not possible to give 
anything approaching a full picture of the variety of measures 
that have been held to constitute measures of equivalent effect 
following the Dassonville formula. Suffice it to say that they 
include the following: import licenses,28 import inspections,29 
 
24. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-463/01, [2004] E.C.R. 11,705, ¶ 65; 
Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int’l Products AB, Case C-405/98, [2001] E.C.R. 
I-1795, ¶ 22; Commission v. Ireland, Case 249/81, [1982] E.C.R. 4005, ¶¶ 22, 25. 
25. Commission v. Greece, Case C-65/05, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,341, ¶ 30. 
26. Frabrice Picod, La Nouvelle Approche de la Cour de Justice en Matière d’Entraves aux 
Échanges [The New Approach of the Court of Justice in Matters of Barriers to Trade], 34 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 169, 186–87 (1998) (Fr.). 
27. See Commission v. Italy (Trailers), Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519; Keck & 
Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 12, 14; Cinéthèque 
SA v. Fédération Nationale des Cinémas Français, Joined Cases 60–61/84, [1985] E.C.R. 
2605, ¶ 21. Moreover, the Court has defined measures of equivalent effect under article 
35 as those which have the “object or effect” of restricting patterns of exports. See supra 
note 5. 
28. See Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la République, Case 41/76, [1976] E.C.R. 
1921; Int’l Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, Joined Cases 51–54/71, 
[1971] E.C.R. 1107. 
29. See Simmenthal SpA v. Ministero delle Finanze Italiano, Case 35/76, [1976] 
E.C.R. 1871; Rewe-Zentralfinanz eGmbH v. Landwirtschaftskammer, Case 4/75, [1975] 
E.C.R. 843.  
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marketing authorizations,30 prohibitions on sale,31 the 
unwarranted reservation to certain goods of generic names,32 or 
indications of origin,33 labeling requirements,34 discrimination in 
the award of public contracts,35 and certain price controls;36 the 
list is almost endless. Where a measure is intended to restrict 
imports, that is no more than an indication that the measure has 
such an effect.37 
Just how wide the scope of article 34 is can be seen from the 
ruling in the Foie Gras case.38 In that case, the Commission 
alleged that France had infringed that provision by laying down 
standards for goods sold under the trade description “foie 
gras.”39 The defendant argued that the infringement was purely 
hypothetical and theoretical, since this product was only 
produced in very small quantities in other Member States, those 
Member States had no specific requirements of their own, and 
products from those Member States generally complied with the 
French standards in any event.40 The Court dismissed this 
 
30. See Commission v. France, Case C-122/03, [2003] E.C.R. I-15,093. 
31. See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649; see also Gilli & Andres, Case 788/79, [1980] 
E.C.R. 2071. 
32. See Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 178/84, [1987] E.C.R. 
1227. 
33. See Commission v. France, Case C-6/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-2389; Pistre, Barthes, 
Milhau, & Oberti, Joined Cases C-321–24/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-2343; Prantl, Case 16/83, 
[1984] E.C.R. 1299; Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 12/74, [1975] 
E.C.R. 181. 
34. See Verein gegen Unwesen im Handel und Gewerb Koeln eV v. Mars GmbH, 
Case C-470/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-1923; Fietje, Case 27/80, [1980] E.C.R. 3839. 
35. See Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-359/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-157; 
Commission v. Denmark, Case C-243/89, [1993] E.C.R. I-3353; Commission v. Ireland, 
Case 45/87, [1988] E.C.R. 4929. 
36. See Roussel v. Netherlands, Case 181/82, [1983] E.C.R. 3849; Netherlands v. 
van Tiggele, Case 82/77, [1978] E.C.R. 25; SA G.B.-Inno-B.M. v. Ass’n des Détaillants en 
Tabac (ATAB), Case 13/77, [1977] E.C.R. 2115. 
37. Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Tankstation ‘t Heukske vof & J.B.E. 
Boermans, Joined Cases C-401 & 402/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-2201, ¶ 22; see also Picod, supra 
note 26. In addition, the intention of the author of a measure may be evidence that it is 
not justified under article 36. 
38. Commission v. France (Foie Gras), Case C-184/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-6197; see also 
A. Mattera, L’arrêt ‘‘Foie Gras’’ du 22 Octobre 1998: Porteur d’une Nouvelle Impulsion pour le 
Perfectionnement du Marché Unique Européen [The "Foie Gras" Ruling of October 22, 1998: 
Bearing a New Impetus for the Development of a Single European Market], 4 REVUE DU 
MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEEN 113 (1998) (Fr.). 
39. Foie Gras, [1998] E.C.R. I-6197, ¶¶ 8–9. 
40. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
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argument in the following terms: “Article [34 TFEU] applies . . . 
not only to the actual effects but also to the potential effects of 
legislation. It cannot be considered inapplicable simply because 
at the present time there are no actual cases with a connection to 
another Member State.”41 
Equally, it is inherent in the Dassonville formula that some 
measures do not constitute even potential or indirect hindrances 
to imports and thus fall outside the Dassonville formula 
altogether. Thus, in a handful of cases—and only a handful—the 
Court has held that measures fell outside article 34 on the 
grounds that the possibility of their effecting imports was “too 
uncertain and indirect.”42 In effect, this is a rule of remoteness. 
In some of these cases, the parties’ reliance on article 34 was 
merely fanciful. For instance, in Peralta,43 perhaps the best known 
of this line of cases, the captain of a ship, accused of dumping 
harmful chemical substances at sea contrary to Italian legislation, 
argued that the legislation was in breach of article 34 since it 
restricted imports of those substances into Italy. Moreover, few 
would question the Court’s assessment in DIP44 that urban 
planning laws restricting the opening of new shops in town 
centers have an impact on imports too uncertain and indirect to 
constitute measures of equivalent effect.45 Whether such a 
measure has any impact on imports at all is dependent on a 
variety of imponderables: the same shops might open at other 
locations, which might even attract more custom; and, even if the 
shops had been authorized in the city center, they might simply 
 
41. Id. ¶ 17 (citation omitted). 
42. See Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori del porto de 
Genova Coop. arl, Case C-266/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-3949, ¶ 31; Esso Española SA v. 
Comunidad Autónoma de Canarias, Case C-134/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4223, ¶ 3; DIP SpA 
v. Commune di Bassano del Grappa, Joined Cases C-l40–42/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-3257, ¶ 
29; Centro Servizi Spediporto Srl v. Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo Srl, Case C-96/94, 
[1995] E.C.R. I-2883, ¶ 41; Peralta, Case C-379/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-3453, ¶ 24. 
43. Peralta, [1994] E.C.R. I-3453. 
44. DIP, [1995] E.C.R. I-3257. 
45. The same principle has been applied to article 35 TFEU (article 29 EC). See ED 
Srl v. Fenocchio, Case C-412/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-3845, ¶ 11. This remoteness test has 
also been applied under article 45 TFEU (article 39 EC) on the free movement of 
workers and article 56 TFEU (article 49 EC) on services. See Viacom Outdoor Srl v. 
Giotto Immobilier SARL, Case C-134/03 [2005] E.C.R. I-1167, ¶ 38 (discussing article 56 
TFEU); Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, Case C-190/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-493, ¶¶ 
24–25 (discussing article 45 TFEU). 
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have drained business away from competitors without increasing 
the overall quantity of imports sold. 
Nevertheless, this line of case law is not free from difficulty, 
in view of its inherently subjective nature: as AG Kokott put it in 
Mickelsson, the criteria of “uncertainty and indirectness” are 
“difficult to clarify and thus do not contribute to legal 
certainty.”46 Since article 34 has to be applied by national courts, 
legal certainty is of paramount importance. This principle should 
therefore be reserved for very clear cases. 
Another important development occurred in van de Haar, 
where it was held that article 34 is not subject to a de minimis 
rule.47 The Court has steadfastly adhered to this fundamental 
tenet ever since.48 A clear illustration of this principle can be seen 
in the charming case of Bluhme.49 The defendant was charged 
with infringing a ban on keeping nectar-gathering bees other 
than the subspecies Apis mellifera mellifera (Læsø brown bee) on 
the tiny Danish island of Læsø and certain neighboring islands.50 
The alleged purpose of this prohibition, which was imposed by 
the Danish Minister of Agriculture, was to protect this particular 
strain of bee from extinction on these islands.51 One of the 
arguments advanced by Denmark was that the decree fell outside 
article 34 as being de minimis, since it covered only 0.3 percent 
of Danish territory.52 Citing Van de Haar, AG Fennelly rejected 
that argument on the grounds that “the slight effect of the 
Decision, in volume terms, cannot, in itself, prevent the 
application of Article [34 TFEU] of the Treaty.”53 The Court 
 
46. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott , Åklagaren v. Mickelsson, Case C-142/05, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 46. 
47. van de Haar & Kaveka de Meern BV, Joined Cases 177–78/82, [1984] E.C.R. 
1797, ¶¶ 13–14. 
48. See Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-
309/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-11,763, ¶ 68 (regarding consumer goods in recoverable 
packaging); Commission v. France, Case C-166/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-6535, ¶ 15 
(regarding precious metals); Commission v. Italy, Case 103/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1759, ¶ 18 
(regarding subsidies for the purchase of national vehicles); Commission v. France, Case 
269/83, [1985] E.C.R. 837, ¶ 10 (regarding periodicals). 
49. Bluhme, Case C-67/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-8033. 
50. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6–8. 
51. Id. ¶ 25. 
52. Id. ¶ 16; Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Bluhme, [1988] E.C.R. I-8033, 
¶ 10. 
53. Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Bluhme, [1988] E.C.R. I-8033, ¶ 18 
(citing van de Haar, [1984] E.C.R. 1797). 
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ruled to the same effect.54 A rare suggestion that the Court 
should abandon its opposition to a de minimis rule came from 
AG Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec v. TFI Publicité.55 However, he proposed 
that overtly discriminatory measures should not be subject to a de 
minimis test, which should therefore be reserved for indistinctly 
applicable measures (i.e., measures which do not discriminate 
against imports on their face).56 
In Schmidberger v. Austria, AG Jacobs suggested that the 
remoteness test in Peralta is in effect a de minimis rule in 
disguise.57 As he pointed out, it would seem out of the question 
for the Court to find that article 34 could ever be engaged where 
a Member State caused a brief traffic delay on a road occasionally 
used for transport between Member States.58 Plainly, it is 
indisputable that in that instance, the rule of remoteness would 
cover the same ground as a de minimis rule: either test would 
lead the Court to exclude the measure from the scope of article 
34. Yet that is not always the case: a measure may constitute an 
actual and direct restriction on a very small proportion of 
imports, as is clearly illustrated by Bluhme. The rule of 
remoteness, in contrast, relates to the intensity of the 
impediment to imports. 
In any case, the crucial question at the heart of the 
controversy surrounding article 34 did not come before the 
Court until five years after Dassonville. The question was this: 
What role does discrimination play? Article 34 speaks of 
restrictions, not discrimination. 
2. Cassis de Dijon 
This question came to the fore in Rewe-Zentral v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, universally known as 
“Cassis de Dijon” after the French black currant-based drink that 
 
54. Bluhme, [1988] E.C.R. I-8033, ¶ 19–20. For another clear illustration, see 
Commission v. France, Case C-212/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-4213, ¶¶ 15–16. 
55. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-
Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA, Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-179, ¶¶ 42–43. 
56. Id. 
57. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Schmidberger v. Austria, Case C-112/00, 
[2003] E.C.R. I-5659, ¶ 65; see also Peralta, Case C-379/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-3453. 
58. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Schmidberger, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659, ¶ 65. 
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was in issue.59 The plaintiffs, who sought to import this drink 
from France into Germany, contested the validity of a provision 
of German law requiring spirits to have a minimum alcohol 
content.60 Cassis de Dijon, which in France had a content of 
between fifteen percent and twenty percent, fell into the category 
of products required to have twenty-five percent alcohol under 
the German provision.61 The German court referred a question 
for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of such a measure 
with article 34 TFEU.62 Never before had the Court had occasion 
to rule on an indistinctly applicable measure. In a seminal 
judgment, the Court held that such measures could fall under 
this provision.63 To underline the importance of this ruling, the 
Commission took the unusual step of issuing a Communication, 
setting out the consequences which it would have.64 
Before long, a raft of judgments confirming Cassis de Dijon 
was delivered. The long series of indistinctly applicable measures 
subjected to the scrutiny of the Court included: an Italian 
prohibition on selling vinegar unless it was based on wine;65 a 
Belgian requirement that margarine be sold in cubic packaging 
so as to distinguish it from butter;66 a ban on the sale of products 
as “beer” unless they were made exclusively with the raw 
materials traditionally permitted in Germany;67 and a French 
prohibition on the sale of substitute milk powder.68 Each of these 
measures was held to constitute a measure of equivalent effect 
contrary to article 34.69 
During this period, a widely held view—perhaps even the 
prevailing view—was that the concept of measures of equivalent 
effect did not depend on whether the measure discriminated 
 
59. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
60. Id. ¶ 4. 
61. Id. ¶ 3. 
62. Id. ¶ 6. 
63. Id. ¶ 15. 
64. See Commission Communication, 1980 O.J. C 256/2 (concerning the 
consequences of the judgment given by the European Court of Justice on February 20, 
1979 in Cassis de Dijon). 
65. Gilli & Andres, Case 788/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2071. 
66. Rau Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PVBA, Case 261/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3961. 
67. Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 178/84, [1988] E.C.R. 1227. 
68. Commission v. France, Case 216/84, [1988] E.C.R. 793. 
69. This involved a finding in each case that the measure was not justified under 
article 36. This provision will be considered below. 
  
1434 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1423 
against imports, but only on whether it restricted them.70 
Discrimination, it was argued, only came into play in the 
following ways: first, a measure which discriminated against 
imports constituted per se an actual or potential, direct or 
indirect restriction on them; second, a discriminatory measure 
was far less likely to be justified under article 36 TFEU. 
However, that view was by no means universal: Marenco 
mounted an attack on the view that non-discriminatory measures 
might be caught by article 34.71 In his view, discrimination was 
the very essence of measures of equivalent effect, although he 
defined discrimination fairly widely to cover “indistinctly 
applicable” measures which required manufacturers of other 
Member States to institute a special production for exports to the 
offending state. By this means he sought to bring the Cassis de 
Dijon line of cases within his theory.72 
Of the many cases on which I worked with Gordon, I 
particularly recall Cinéthèque SA v. Fédération Nationale des Cinémas 
Français,73 a case decided five years after Cassis de Dijon. The 
proceedings concerned an indistinctly applicable prohibition on 
the sale or rental of video cassettes of any film within one year of 
that film being authorized for showing in cinemas.74 At that 
stage, I was still imbued with the idea that the scope of article 34 
must be defined as widely as possible. After much soul-searching, 
Gordon informed me that he could not advocate that approach 
in this case. Instead, in his opinion, he asserted: 
 
70. See LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE 
EEC 262–63 (1985). I myself plead guilty to the charge of espousing this view at the 
time. PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EEC ¶ 6.46 (2d ed. 1988). 
However, de jure or de facto discrimination was clearly the determining criterion in 
relation to price controls. See, e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
71. Giuliano Marenco, Pour une Interprétation Traditionnelle de la Notion de Mesure 
D’Effet équivalant à une Restriction Quantitative [For a Traditional Interpretation of the 
Measure of Equivalent Effect Concept to a Quantitative Restriction], 20 CAHIERS DE DROIT 
EUROPÉEN 291 (1984) (Fr.) (analyzing case law in discrimination terms). 
72. Id. For a much attenuated form of this theory, see Lucette Defalque, Le Concept 
de Discrimination en Matière de Libre Circulation des Marchandises, 23 CAHIERS DU DROIT 
EUROPÉEN 471 (1987) (Fr.); Michel Waelbroeck, Mesures D’effet Equivalent, Discrimination 
Formelle et Matérielle dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice [Measures of Equivalent Effect, 
Formal Discrimination and Material in the European Court of Justice], in 2 LIBER AMICORUM 
FREDERIC DUMON 1329 (1983) (Fr.). 
73. Cinéthèque SA v. Fédération Nationale des Cinémas Français, Joined Cases 60–
61/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2605. 
74. Id. ¶ 2. 
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[W]here a national measure is not specifically directed at 
imports, does not discriminate against imports, does not 
make it any more difficult for an importer to sell his 
products than it is for a domestic producer, and gives no 
protection to domestic producers, then in my view, prima 
facie, the measure does not fall within Article [34 TFEU] 
even if it does in fact lead to a restriction or reduction of 
imports.75 
The Court, however, found that the measure fell within 
article 34. It accepted that the measure did “not have the 
purpose of regulating trade patterns”76 and its effect was “not to 
favour national production as against the production of other 
Member States, but to encourage cinematographic production as 
such.”77 Yet it found that the measure still fell foul of article 34.78 
This finding was of crucial importance, although the Court then 
proceeded to find that the measure was justified.79 
Time was to prove—and this was no surprise—that Gordon 
had had considerably more foresight than I, or the Court for that 
matter! Shortly afterwards, the Court was flooded with references 
for preliminary rulings on national measures which had only a 
tenuous connection with imports. 
The matter came to a head with a spate of cases relating to 
national restrictions on Sunday trading. The first of these cases 
was Torfaen v. B&Q, which concerned the statute then-in force in 
England and Wales.80 This indistinctly applicable measure was 
quite far removed from imports and manifestly not targeted at 
them in any way. At the same time, B&Q furnished strong 
evidence that, by opening its shops on Sundays, it was able to 
increase its sales substantially: if the shops were closed on 
Sundays, the loss of sales on that day was not compensated by 
sales during the rest of the week. Since imports accounted for a 
significant percentage of turnover, it followed that the contested 
legislation had the effect of reducing imports.81 
 
75. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Cinéthèque, [1985] E.C.R. 2605. 
76. Cinéthèque, [1985] E.C.R. 2605, ¶ 21. As mentioned, supra note 27, this is a rare 
instance of the Court referring to a purpose of a measure in this context. 
77. Cinéthèque, [1985] E.C.R. 2605, ¶ 21. 
78. Id. ¶ 22. 
79. Id. ¶ 23. 
80. Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc, Case 145/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3851. 
81. Id. ¶ 17. 
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After a very thorough review of the case law, AG van Gerven 
reached the conclusion that a restriction on Sunday trading did 
not constitute a measure of equivalent effect within the meaning 
of article 34 at all, unless it discriminated against imports in some 
way or “screened off” the domestic market.82 For the concept of 
“screening off,” which was of an economic rather than a legal 
nature, he drew on ideas developed in relation to what is now 
article 101 TFEU (formerly article 81 EC). He urged the Court to 
have regard to “the entire legal and economic context.”83 This 
approach would have involved a major break with the case law 
going right back to its inception with Dassonville. Under the test 
in that case, statistical information is irrelevant, whereas the AG 
proposed, in effect, that such information should be required. 
More seriously, his approach would, it is submitted, have 
failed to “provide the courts with a clear and decisive guideline 
on which to base their judgments,” since it would have required 
them to have regard to “the entire legal and economic 
context.”84 In short, this approach is not consonant with the 
principle of legal certainty. Indeed, to say that a measure of 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports is a 
measure which “screens off” the domestic market from imports is 
merely a tautologous statement, not a definition which clarifies 
the concept. The Court declined to follow the Advocate General. 
Instead, it ruled that in principle this measure fell under article 
34, but in such ambiguous terms as to create the utmost legal 
uncertainty. A surge of further cases on Sunday trading 
restrictions followed.85 
 
82. Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Torfaen, [1989] E.C.R. 3851. 
83. Id. 
84. Kamiel Mortelmans, Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating to Market 
Circumstances: Time to Consider a New Definition?, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 115, 127 
(1991). More recently, an approach markedly similar to that of Advocate General van 
Gerven in Torfaen was propounded by Wilsher. Daniel Wilsher, Does “Keck” 
Discrimination Make Sense? An Assessment of the Non-Discrimination Principle Within the Single 
Market, 33 EUR. L. REV. 3, 3 (2008). This author takes the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) as his model without recognizing that, unlike article 34, the provisions of the 
WTO do not have to be applied by domestic courts. 
85. See, e.g., Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent v. B & Q plc, Case C-169/91, 
[1992] E.C.R. I-6635; Marchandise, Case C-332/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-1027; Union 
Départementale des Syndicats CGT de l’Aisne v. SIDEF Conforama, Case C-312/89, 
[1991] E.C.R. I-997. 
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3. Keck and its Aftermath 
Four years after Torfaen, in its seminal judgment in Keck & 
Mithouard, the Court expressed its impatience with this highly 
unsatisfactory situation: 
In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke 
Article [34 TFEU] of the Treaty as a means of challenging 
any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom 
even where such rules are not aimed at products from other 
Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-
examine and clarify its case-law on this matter.86 
The Court then proceeded to revolutionize the law relating to 
article 34 TFEU by adopting an approach first propounded by 
my colleague Eric White in an article published in 1989.87 The 
key passage of the judgment reads: 
It is established by the case-law beginning with “Cassis de 
Dijon” that, in the absence of harmonization of legislation, 
obstacles to free movement of goods where they are the 
consequence of applying, to goods coming from other 
Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and 
marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by 
such goods (such as those relating to designation, form, size, 
weight, composition, presentation, labelling, packaging) 
constitute measures of equivalent effect prohibited by Article 
[34 TFEU]. This is so even if those rules apply without 
distinction to all products unless their application can be 
justified by a public-interest objective taking precedence over 
the free movement of goods.  
By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, 
the application to products from other Member States of 
national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling 
arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially, trade between Member States within 
the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those 
provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the 
national territory and so long as they affect in the same 
 
86. Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267–68/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶ 14. The 
reference to measures “aimed at products from other Member States” is a rare reference 
to the purpose of a measure. Id. ¶ 12; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
87. Eric White, In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, 26 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 235 (1989). The Commission first advanced this theory in Torfaen, but in 
that case its proposal fell on deaf ears. See Torfaen, [1989] E.C.R. 3851, ¶ 6. 
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manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic 
products and of those from other Member States. 
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application 
of such rules to the sale of products from another Member 
State meeting the requirements laid down by that State is not 
by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to 
impede access any more than it impedes the access of 
domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the 
scope of Article [34 TFEU].88 
In paragraph 17, the Court made it clear that “access to the 
market” is the test underlying the entire approach set out in that 
judgment; as Barnard has put it, “the need to secure market 
access pervades the judgment.”89 This can scarcely come as a 
surprise: as already pointed out, by definition restrictions on 
imports constitute barriers to access to the market of the Member 
State in question. At the same time, the Court appears to 
acknowledge that, in view of its nebulous nature, “access to the 
market” is not a sufficient criterion in itself and needs to be 
fleshed out by more specific rules such as those in paragraphs 15 
and 16. 
In any case, the ruling in Keck unleashed a torrent of 
comment90 which was overwhelmingly hostile, albeit for a wide 
 
88. Keck & Mithouard, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 15–17. 
89. CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU—THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS, 155 (2d ed. 2007). 
90. The following is merely a small selection of the literature: Thomas Ackermann, 
Warenverkehrsfreiheit und “Verkaufsmodalitäten” [Free Movement of Goods and “Selling 
Arrangements”], 40 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 189 (1994) (F.R.G); 
Jürgen Basedow, Keck on the Facts, 54 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 
225 (1994) (F.R.G.); Laurence W. Gormley, Reasoning Renounced? The Remarkable 
Judgment in Keck and Mithouard, 5 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 63 (1994); Santiago Martinez-Lage, 
Revisión Jurisprudencial Sobre la Libre Circulación de Mercancías [Review of Cases on the Free 
Movement of Goods], GACETA JURIDICA DE LA C.E. Y DE LA COMPETENCIA, Dec. 1993, at 1–3 
(Spain); Alfonso Mattera, De L’arrêt ‘Dassonville’ à L’arrêt ‘Keck’: L’obscure Clarté d’une 
Jurisprudence Riche en Principes Novateurs et en Contradictions [From the ‘Dassonville’ Case to 
the ‘Keck’ Case: The Obscure Clarity of Cases Rich in Principles and Contradictions], REVUE DU 
MARCHÉ UNIQUE EUROPÉEN 117 (1994) (Fr.); S. Moore, Re-visiting the Limits of Article 30 
EEC, 19. EUR. L. REV. 195 (1994); Kamiel Mortelmans, Case Note, 442 SOCIAAL-
ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 115, 115 (1994); Picod, supra note 26, at 169; Norbert Reich, 
The “November Revolution” of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi Revisited, 
31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 459 (1994); Jules Stuyck, Case Note, 35 CAHIERS DU DROIT 
EUROPÉEN 435 (1994) (Fr.); Mario Todino & Tilman Lüder, La Jurisprudence Keck en 
Matière de Publicité: Vers un Marché Unique Inachevé? [The Keck Case on Advertising Material: 
Towards a Single Market Incomplete?], 1 REVUE DU MARCHÉ UNIQUE EUROPÉEN 171 (1995) 
(Fr.); Richard Wainwright & Virginia Melgar, Bilan de l’Article 30 Après Vingt ans de 
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variety of reasons. This has persisted into the twenty-first 
century.91 No doubt, this hostility is due in part to a defect from 
which the ruling has suffered since birth: its drafting leaves a 
good deal to be desired.92 First, the concept of restrictions on 
selling arrangements, which the Court did not even attempt to 
define, was woefully unclear. Second, what was meant by 
“certain” selling arrangements? Were some restrictions on selling 
arrangements not governed by the principle set out in paragraph 
16? Third, were the rules in paragraphs 15 and 16 mutually 
exclusive? Finally, what of the various residual measures which 
did not fall within either paragraph? 
On the other hand, the category of measures covered by 
paragraph 15 of the judgment (generally referred to as “product-
bound measures”) was reasonably certain from the outset, since 
the Court took the trouble to set out a non-exhaustive list. 
Moreover, it was clear that, as regards this class of restriction, the 
Cassis de Dijon approach lived on. 
What is more, the subsequent case law clarified a number of 
the areas of doubt mentioned above. For instance, it soon 
became plain that the two categories of measure are mutually 
exclusive. Similarly, it became clear that the category of measures 
relating to selling arrangements referred to in paragraph 16 of 
the ruling in Keck covered the following: restrictions on when 
 
Jurisprudence: de Dassonville à Keck et Mithouard [Review of Article 30 After Twenty Years of 
Jurisprudence: From Dassonville to Keck and Mithouard], 381 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN 
ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 533, 533 (1994) (Fr.); Stephen Weatherill, After Keck Some 
Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 885 (1996). 
91. Claus D. Classen, Die Grundfreiheiten im Spannungsfeld von Europäischer 
Marktfreiheit und Mitgliedstaatlichen Regelungskompetenzen [The Fundamental Freedoms in 
Conflict with the European Free Market and the Member States’ Regulatory Powers], 2004 
EUROPA UND RECHT 416 (F.R.G.); Laurence W. Gormley, Silver Threads Among the Gold 
. . . 50 Years of the Free Movement of Goods, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1637 (2008) 
[hereinafter Gormley, Silver Threads]; Laurence W. Gormley, The Definition of Measures 
Having Equivalent Effect, in CONTINUITY AND EU LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR FRANCIS 
JACOBS 189 (2007) [hereinafter Gormley, The Definition of Measures]; Franz Mayer, Die 
Warenverkehrsfreiheit im Europarecht – eine Rekonstruktion [The Free Movement of Goods in 
Europe – A Reconstruction], 38 EUROPA UND RECHT 793 (2003); Peter-Christian Müller-
Graff, Commentary on Article 28 EC, in 1 VERTRAG ÜBER DIE EUROPÄISCHE UNION UND 
VERTRAG ZUR GRÜNDUNG DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 1045 (H. von der Groeben 
& Schwarze eds., 6th ed. 2003) (F.R.G.). 
92. Even a member of the Court conceded this. See Judge Joliet, La libre Circulation 
des Marchandises: L’arrêt Keck et Mithouard dans les Nouvelles Orientations de la Jurisprudence 
[The Free Movement of Goods: The Keck and Mithouard Case on the New Direction in 
Jurisprudence], in JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX—DROIT EUROPÉEN 145 (1994) (Fr.). 
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goods may be sold;93 restrictions on where or by whom goods may 
be sold;94 price controls;95 and advertising restrictions.96 However, 
as explained below, the latter appear to be sui generis. 
Measures which subject the marketing of products to the 
requirement to obtain a prior authorization are not selling 
arrangements. In Canal Satélite Digital v. Spain, it was held that 
this was due to “the need in certain cases to adapt the products 
in question to the rules in force in the Member State in which 
they are marketed.”97 In any case, such schemes can lead to 
delays, and they confer discretion on the public authorities 
concerned and thus entail a risk of arbitrary action. 
 
93. See Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco, Joined Cases C-
418–21, 460–64/93, 9–15, 23–24, 332/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2975; Tankstation ‘t Heukske 
vof & J.B.E. Boermans, Joined Cases C-401–02/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-2199; Punto Casa SpA 
v. Sindaco del Comune di Capena, Joined Cases C-69 & 258/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-2355. 
94. See Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV, Case C-322/01 
[2003] E.C.R. I-14,887; Schutzverband Gegen Unlauteren Wettbewerb v. TK-Heimdienst 
Sass GmbH, Case C-254/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-151; Commission v. Greece, Case C-391/92, 
[1995] E.C.R. I-1621.  
95. See Fachverband der Buch-und Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH, Case C-531/07 [2009] E.C.R. I-3717, ¶ 36 (holding that “[n]ational provisions, 
which prohibit importers of German-language books from fixing a price lower than the 
retail price fixed or recommended by the publisher in the State of publication, cannot 
be justified under Articles 30 EC and 151 EC or by overriding requirements in the 
public interest”); Groupement National des Négociants en Pommes de Terre de 
Belgique v. ITM Belgium SA, Case C-63/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-2467, ¶ 15 (holding that 
article 30 of the EEC Treaty does not apply where a member state prohibits any sale 
which produces a very low profit margin by legislation). These were already subject to a 
discrimination test prior to Keck. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
96. See Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int’l Products AB, Case C-405/98, 
[2001] E.C.R. I-1795, ¶ 22 (holding that the EC Treaty does not preclude a prohibition 
on the advertising of alcoholic beverages); Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agostini 
(Svenska) Förlag AB, Joined Cases C-34–36/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3843, ¶ 47 (holding that 
“a Member State is not precluded from taking . . . measures against an advertiser in 
relation to television advertising, provided that those provisions affect in the same way, 
in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member 
States”); Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA, Case C-
412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-179, ¶ 48 (holding that the EC Treaty does not “preclude 
Member States from prohibiting, by statute or by regulation, the broadcasting of 
advertisements for the distribution sector by television broadcasters established on their 
territory”); Hünermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, Case C-
292/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-6787, ¶ 24 (holding that “[a]rticle 30 of the EEC Treaty is to be 
interpreted as not applying to a rule of professional conduct, laid down by the 
pharmacists’ professional body in a Member State, which prohibits pharmacists from 
advertising quasi-pharmaceutical products outside the pharmacy”). 
97. Canal Satélite Digital SL v. Adminstración General del Estado,, Case C-390/99, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-607, ¶ 30; see also Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v. Avides Media AG, 
Case C-244/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-505, ¶ 31. 
  
2010] TRAILERS & JET SKIS: ARTICLE 34 TFEU 1441 
In Alfa Vita,98 the Court was confronted with a different kind 
of measure. The case concerned so-called “bake-off” products, 
that is, bread which is first half-baked, then frozen and 
transported to the point of sale (typically a supermarket), where 
it is thawed and the baking is completed.99 The contested Greek 
legislation required vendors of such goods, whether domestic or 
imported, to comply with all the standards imposed on 
traditional bakeries, including the obligation to have a flour 
store, an area for kneading equipment, and a solid-fuel store.100 
The Court held that such a measure clearly aimed to “specify the 
production conditions for bakery products, including ‘bake-off’ 
products” and did not “take the specific nature of these products 
into account and [entailed] extra costs, thereby making the 
marketing of those products more difficult.”101 Thus, it could not 
be regarded as a measure relating to a selling arrangement.102 At 
first sight, this outcome might seem surprising: the Pavlovian 
reaction is to think that, because this legislation took effect at the 
point of sale, it must relate to a selling arrangement. In reality, as 
the Court pointed out, it directly affected the method of 
production of the goods concerned. Quite apart from that, the 
measure effectively defeated the purpose of selling “bake-off” 
products at all, and it was therefore tantamount to a ban on sale 
of this type of bread. 
When any doubt exists as to whether a measure is “product-
bound” or relates to a selling arrangement, the Court tends to 
incline towards the former.103 This has not been formulated as a 
 
98. Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Dimosio, Joined Cases C-158–59/04, [2006] E.C.R. 
I-8135. 
99. Id. ¶ 19. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.  
102. Id. ¶ 19. 
103. See Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich 
Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3689 (relating to a prohibition on the sale 
of periodicals containing games or competitions for prizes; again this could have been 
categorized as a restriction on the content of the periodicals (a product-bound measure) 
or as a restriction on promotion (a “selling arrangement”)); Verein gegen Unwesen in 
Handel und Gewerb Köln eV v. Mars GmbH, Case C-470/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-1923 
(concerning a prohibition on the sale of ice cream bars with wrapping papers bearing 
the symbols “+10%.” Theoretically, two alternative options were open to the Court: it 
could treat such a measure either as a labeling requirement (a product-bound measure) 
or as an advertising restriction (a “selling arrangement”)). In both cases, the Court 
found that the measures in issue were to be regarded as product-bound. 
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principle, but it certainly appears to be the Court’s practice. 
Having said that, at the risk of stating the obvious, the mere fact 
that a national provision refers to a specified category of goods—
as it necessarily must, unless it applies to all goods—does not 
prevent it from constituting a rule relating to a selling 
arrangement.  
As just mentioned, one significant point left open by the 
judgment in Keck was the fate of measures that are not product-
bound and do not relate to selling arrangements (“residual 
measures”). Some of these residual measures, such as import 
licenses or controls and acts of discrimination in the award of 
public supply contracts, are discriminatory by their very nature. 
Other residual measures, such as marketing authorizations and 
restrictions on use, may be indistinctly applicable. Successive 
judgments have shown that these residual measures fall under 
article 34, regardless of whether they are discriminatory or not.104 
Consequently, it would seem that the two categories of 
measure recognized by the court today are not the same as those 
refererred to in Keck. In that judgment, a distinction was made 
between (i) product-bound measures and (ii) selling 
arrangements. Now, in contrast, the Court would seem to have 
acknowledged the need to accommodate residual measures, so 
that the categories appear to have been redefined as follows: (i) 
selling arrangements and (ii) all other measures.105 
Even if a measure is found to relate to selling arrangements, 
it only falls outside article 34 if it passes the two-fold test set out 
in paragraph 16 of the judgment in Keck: (1) it must “apply to all 
relevant traders operating within the national territory”;106 and 
(2) it must “affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the 
marketing of domestic products and of those from other 
Member States.”107 
The Court has never explained the meaning of the first of 
these conditions, and it is hard—or, perhaps, impossible—to find 
 
104. On marketing authorization schemes, see generally Dynamic Medien, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-505, and Canal Satélite Digital, [2002] E.C.R. I-607. As to restrictions on use, see 
Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha AB, Case 473/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-5681, ¶¶ 34–
49. 
105. See Niels Fenger, Article 28 EC and Restrictions on Use of a Legally Marketed 
Product, 13 EUR. L. REP. 326, 331 (2009). 
106. Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267–68/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶ 16. 
107. Id. 
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a single case which has turned on it. Such rare attempts as have 
been made to clarify it have all portrayed it as being directed at 
discriminatory measures.108 Since that is the function of the 
second condition, one is driven to the conclusion that the first 
condition is redundant. 
As to the second condition, the concept of discrimination in 
law raises no difficulty: discrimination is plain on the face of the 
measure. In contrast, discrimination “in fact” is less 
straightforward. In Commission v. Greece (processed milk for 
infants), the Court pointed out that the concept of de facto 
discrimination ought not to depend on data which may vary over 
time, since otherwise a measure could constantly oscillate 
between falling within and outside article 34.109 A good 
illustration of the Court’s interpretation of the concept of de 
facto discrimination may be seen in Deutscher Apothekerverband.110 
In that case, an indistinctly applicable ban on marketing 
pharmaceuticals over the internet in Germany was held to 
discriminate against imports: while German pharmacies were 
able to sell their products in their dispensaries, the internet 
provided a “more significant way” for those established in other 
Member States to gain direct access to that market.111 It is hard to 
see how the Court could have held otherwise. Having said that, 
the Court must take care not to define the concept of de facto 
discrimination too broadly, otherwise the distinction between 
measures relating to selling arrangements and other restrictions 
is at risk of breaking down altogether. In that case the entire 
approach in Keck would be in tatters. 
Although advertising is a selling arrangement, legislation 
relating to this activity is treated as a special case. This harks back 
to the highly influential insight of AG Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec112 as 
to the central importance of advertising for market integration. 
 
108. See Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Tankstation ‘t Heukske vof & 
J.B.E. Boermans, Joined Cases C-401–02/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-2201, ¶ 21; see also Opinion 
of Advocate General van Gerven, Punto Casa SpA v. Sindaco del Comune di Capena, 
Case C-69/93, [1994] E.C.R. I-2355, ¶¶ 8–9; see also Müller-Graff , supra note 91, at 1049. 
109. Commission v. Greece, Case C-391/92, [1995] E.C.R. I-1621, ¶ 17. 
110. Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV, Case C-322/01, 
[2003] E.C.R. I-14,887. 
111. Id. ¶ 74; see also Commission v. Germany, Case C-141/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6935, 
¶¶ 34–45. 
112. Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA, Case C-
412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-179. 
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Since in general each product is little known outside its own 
Member State, he regarded advertising as crucial if traders are to 
penetrate other markets. Thus “measures that prohibit or 
severely restrict advertising tend inevitably to protect domestic 
manufacturers and to disadvantage manufacturers located in 
other Member States.”113 As a result, it would seem that total bans 
on advertising constitute measures of equivalent effect, as they 
are considered to discriminate against imports per se.114 
By clarifying these various points over a period of several 
years, the Court has taken some of the steam out of those hostile 
comments voiced by authors such as Mattera, Reich, and 
Stuyck115 based on the lack of clarity of the ruling in Keck.116 
However, others have focused on the inconsistencies in the 
Court’s application of the distinction between product-bound 
restrictions and those relating to selling arrangements. The most 
notable example is AG Maduro in Alfa Vita.117 Within the 
confines of this Article it is not possible to do justice to all the 
criticism of Keck and its progeny. Suffice it to concentrate on the 
two most authoritative assaults on this case law: the opinion of 
AG Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec, and the much more recent opinion of 
AG Maduro in Alfa Vita. 
In Leclerc-Siplec, AG Jacobs gave two reasons for finding the 
reasoning in Keck to be unsatisfactory: it was inappropriate to 
make such rigid distinctions between different categories of 
measure, since “the severity of the restriction imposed by 
different rules is merely one of degree”; and in any event a test 
based solely on discrimination was inappropriate, although 
 
113. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] E.C.R. I-179, ¶ 21. 
114. Konsumentombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB, Joined Cases 
C-34–35/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3843, ¶ 42; Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet Int’l 
Products AB, Case C-405/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-1795, ¶ 21. 
115. See supra note 90. 
116. Gormley acknowledges this in The Definition of Measures, supra note 91, at 198. 
The same author, while still critical of Keck, now considers that, in the light of the 
subsequent case law, that judgment must be regarded as effecting a less radical change 
in the Court’s approach than initially appeared. Gormley, Silver Threads, supra note 91. 
117. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Dimosio, 
Joined Cases C-158–59/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-8135, ¶ 27 (referring to Verein gegen 
Unwesen im Handel und Gewerbe Köln eV v. Mars Gmb, Case C-470/93, [1995] E.C.R. 
I-1923); see also Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267–68/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶ 15 
(stating that packaging requirements are to be product-based measures). All the 
commentators hostile to Keck mentioned in this Article have focused on such 
inconsistencies in the case law. 
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discriminatory measures would necessarily fall within article 34.118 
While there is much force in these criticisms, the fact remains 
that he was unable to propose a more satisfactory test. His 
suggestion was that in all cases the test should be whether the 
measure constituted a substantial barrier to market access. Apart 
from the fact that this would introduce a de minimis test into 
article 34, the “barrier to market access” criterion is inherently 
nebulous. Admittedly, unlike AG van Gerven in Torfaen, he did 
not propose to have regard to economic data. Instead, he 
suggested that a series of factors (e.g., whether the measure 
applied to all goods and, in the case of selling arrangements, 
whether other marketing arrangements were available) should be 
taken into account.119 It is submitted that this would still have 
caused problems of legal uncertainty. On one view, the “barrier 
to market access” test is merely a restatement of the Dassonville 
formula, and the experience, particularly with the Sunday 
trading cases, has shown that that formula does not suffice by 
itself. 
It is true, as AG Jacobs pointed out, that some non-
discriminatory measures relating to selling arrangements could 
be highly restrictive of imports and should therefore not escape 
article 34. In his article, White had expressly acknowledged this 
point.120 He gave the example of a measure permitting the sale of 
cigarettes only on Christmas day; in his view, such a measure 
must be assimilated to a prohibition on sale.121 Accordingly, this 
problem can be satisfactorily addressed without there being any 
need to abandon Keck. In any case, this solution should be 
reserved for extreme cases, and it is doubtful whether the Court 
has ever encountered such a case. 
Relying on the Leclerc-Siplec opinion, in Alfa Vita AG Maduro 
proposed that the principles of Keck be thoroughly recast, but 
without jettisoning the distinction between product-bound 
measures and selling arrangements.122 One of his aims was to 
 
118. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] E.C.R. I-179, ¶ 
38. 
119. Cf. Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven, Torfaen Borough Council v. B 
& Q plc, Case 145/88 [1989] ECR 3851, ¶ 23. 
120. See White, supra note 87, at 258. 
121. See id. at 258–59. 
122. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Alfa Vita, [2006] E.C.R. I-8135, ¶¶ 31, 
35. 
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bring the jurisprudence on the free movement of goods in line 
with that of the other three freedoms.123 This required, according 
to AG Maduro, that Member States take into consideration the 
effects of their measures on all citizens of the EU who seek to 
exercise one of the freedoms under the Treaty.124 The task of the 
Court in this context is to ensure that Member States do not treat 
situations straddling the border between each other less favorably 
than situations confined to a single Member State. 
He then suggested three main criteria. First, any 
discrimination based on nationality, direct or indirect, must be 
prohibited.125 Second, additional costs as a consequence of 
discrepancies between the Member States’ legislation would not 
necessarily amount to a hindrance to one of the freedoms.126 
They could be regarded as such only if they resulted from the 
Member State’s failure to take into consideration the specific 
situation of imports, in particular the fact that they have to 
comply with the requirements of their Member State of origin. 
Product requirements will therefore always amount to 
hindrances. Rules relating to selling arrangements will fall within 
this category only if they fail to take the specific situation of 
imports into consideration. Third, there will be a measure having 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction if a national 
provision more severely restricts market access and marketing of 
products from other Member States.127 The measure will be a 
hindrance to market access if it protects the position of the 
incumbents or if it renders intra-EU trade more onerous than 
trade on the national market.128 
Despite the force of this opinion, it is open to criticism on 
two grounds. First, it arguably attached excessive importance to 
the idea of a unitary approach to the four freedoms. For the 
reasons set out in Part II of this Article, this idea has its limits. 
Consequently, it is submitted, the Court should not abandon 
principles which are appropriate for article 34 merely because 
they are not suited to the corresponding provisions relating to 
the other three freedoms. Second, while the opinion expressed 
 
123. Id. ¶¶ 32, 37. 
124. Id. ¶ 40. 
125. Id. ¶ 43. 
126. Id. ¶ 44. 
127. Id. ¶ 45. 
128. Id. ¶¶ 43–45. 
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dissatisfaction with the case law as it stood, it failed to provide a 
clear test to replace it. 
My own view continues to be that the core of Keck is sound: 
measures relating to selling arrangements—as defined by the 
Court in subsequent judgments—are less harmful to imports 
than other restrictions since they do not impose additional costs 
on traders.129 By their very nature, restrictions such as Sunday 
trading legislation, a requirement that spectacles be sold by 
opticians, or a requirement that baby food be sold exclusively in 
pharmacies tend to be less harmful than product-bound 
measures or the residual measures discussed earlier. Having said 
that, there are inevitably borderline cases, and the case law has 
not always been consistent. Without any doubt, given that more 
than fifteen years have passed and several hundred judgments 
have been delivered since the ruling in Keck, the time has come 
to clarify and streamline the relevant principles. 
4. Article 34 Confers No General Freedom to Trade 
Before turning to the two judgments which are the focus of 
this Article, it is as well to recall what article 34 TFEU is not. As 
AG Tesauro robustly pointed out in Hünermund, article 34 does 
not provide for a general freedom to trade or the right to the 
unhindered pursuit of one’s commercial activities, but is aimed 
at restrictions on imports.130 Recalling this statement, AG Maduro 
asserted in Alfa Vita:  
Community nationals cannot draw from [article 34 TFEU] 
an absolute right to economic or commercial freedom. 
Indeed, the Treaty provisions relating to the free movement 
of goods aim to guarantee the opening-up of national 
markets, offering producers and consumers the possibility of 
fully enjoying the benefits of a Community internal market, 
 
129. For other authors who consider criticism of the judgment in Keck to be 
exaggerated, see Stefan Enchelmaier, The Awkward Selling of a Good Idea, or a 
Traditionalist Interpretation of Keck, 22 Y.B. EUR. L. 249 (2003), and Robert Kovar, 
Dassonville, Keck et les Autres: de la Mesure Avant Toute Chose [Dassonville, Keck, and the 
Others: Measure Before All Things], 42 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEAN 213 
(2006) (Fr.). 
130. Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Hünermund v. 
Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, Case C-292/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-6787, ¶¶ 
1, 25–26. 
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and not to encourage a general deregulation of national 
economies. 
. . . . 
[T]he task of the Court is not to call into question as a 
matter of course Member States’ economic policies. It is 
instead responsible for satisfying itself that those States do 
not adopt measures which, in actual fact, lead to cross-border 
situations being treated less favourably than purely national 
situations.131 
In the same vein, in Caixa Bank, AG Tizzano rejected an 
argument relating to article 49 TFEU (formerly article 43 EC) on 
services, on the basis that it would be 
tantamount to bending the Treaty to a purpose for which it 
was not intended: that is to say, not in order to create an 
internal market in which conditions are similar to those of a 
single market and where operators can move freely, but in 
order to establish a market without rules. Or rather, a market 
in which rules are prohibited as a matter of principle, except 
for those necessary and proportionate to meeting imperative 
requirements in the public interest.132 
These statements cannot be seriously contested. Amidst the 
uncertainties which currently beset this area of the law, this point 
is refreshingly free from controversy. Article 34 must on no 
account be confused with article 16 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which provides: 
“The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union 
law and national laws and practices is recognised.”133 
 
131. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Alfa Vita, Joined Cases C-158–59/04, 
[2006] E.C.R. I-8135 ¶¶ 37, 41. 
132. Caixa Bank France v. Ministère de l’Economie, del Finances et de l’Industrie, 
Case C-442/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-8961, ¶ 63. 
133. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 16, 2010 O.J. C 
83/389, at 395 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. Article 6(1) TEU as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon renders the Charter binding with “the same value as 
the Treaties”. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 6(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 19; see also 
Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 617, 661 (2008) (referring to the Constitutional Treaty that “proposed fully 
incorporating the Charter into the Union’s primary law and conferring upon it binding 
legal status”). 
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B. Justification Under Article 36 
Article 36 TFEU reads: 
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy 
or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
or the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States.134 
Since free movement of goods is an exception to a fundamental 
principle of the Treaty, and article 36 constitutes an exception to 
that principle, it is to be construed narrowly.135 For the same 
reason, the party seeking to show that a measure falling within 
either article 34 TFEU or article 35 TFEU is justified bears the 
burden of proving that proposition.136 To discharge this burden, 
it does not suffice for a party to show that a measure falls within 
one of the grounds of justification set out in article 36 TFEU. It 
must also demonstrate that no arbitrary discrimination or 
disguised discrimination on trade between Member States is 
involved. Most importantly of all, it must show that the measure is 
justified, that is, necessary and proportionate. 
The principle of proportionality displays a Protean quality.137 
In its classic manifestation under article 36, a measure must be 
no more restrictive of imports or exports than is necessary to 
achieve its legitimate objective.138 Yet the principle also takes 
 
134. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 36, 2010 O.J. C 83/1, at 61. 
135. See Bauhuis v. Netherlands, Case 46/76, [1977] E.C.R. 5. 
136. Firma Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Minister für Ernähung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 251/78, [1979] E.C.R. 3369, ¶ 24. 
This ruling has been confirmed on countless occasions. See, e.g., Commission v. 
Portugal, Case C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶ 39 (concerning tinted windows); 
Commission v. Belgium, Case C-227/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-46, ¶¶ 62–63 (full text of case 
available only in French); Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-297/05, [2007] E.C.R. 
7467, ¶ 76 (concerning vehicle identification); Commission v. France, Case C-24/00, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-1277, ¶ 53 (concerning nutrients). 
137. See generally TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW, 136–74 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
138. See de Peijper, Case 104/75, [1976] E.C.R. 613, ¶¶ 16–18, cited with approval in 
Joh. Eggers Sohn & Co. v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case 13/78, [1978] E.C.R. 1935, ¶ 
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many other forms. Thus, if a measure contains an inconsistency, 
that will prevent it from being justified.139 Furthermore, in 
Hartlauer v. Wiener Landesregierung, a case concerning 
establishment, the Court stated: “national legislation is 
appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective pursued 
only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent 
and systematic manner.”140 Equally, in Radlberger v. Land Baden-
Württemberg, legislation was held not to be consonant with the 
principle of proportionality on the grounds that traders were 
given insufficient time to adapt to it.141 In Mickelsson, as we shall 
see, the principle of proportionality assumed yet another form.142 
Since Cassis de Dijon, the Court has recognized a series of 
“mandatory requirements,” grounds of justification other than 
those expressly spelled out in article 36.143 While the categories 
 
30; Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 
Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, ¶ 8; Commission v. France, Case C-212/03, [2005] 
E.C.R. I-4213, ¶ 43. Sometimes, the Court even identifies an alternative measure which 
would achieve the desired aim without affecting interstate trade to the same degree. For 
instance, a requirement that products be adequately labeled has often been held to 
constitute a suitable substitute for a sales ban or a ban on a particular designation. See 
Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, ¶ 13; see also Guimont, Case C-448/98, [2000] E.C.R. I-
10,663, ¶¶ 31–34. For a more recent example, see Commission v. Germany, Case C-
387/99, [2004] E.C.R. I-3751, ¶ 81 (concerning vitamins). 
139. See Corporacíón Dermoestética SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media, Case C-
500/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-5785, ¶ 39 (concerning the parallel provisions relating to 
establishment and services, respectively articles 54 TFEU (article 48 EC) and 62 TFEU 
(article 55 EC)). 
140. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregierung, Case C-
169/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1721, ¶ 55; see also Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v. 
Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, Case C-42/07, [2009] 
E.C.R. __, ¶ 61, [2010] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (relating to services). 
141. Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-
309/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-11,763, ¶¶ 80–81; see also Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, 
[2005] E.C.R. I-9871, ¶ 90; Commission v. Germany, Case C-463/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-
11,705, ¶¶ 79–80.  
142. See  discussion infra notes 239–40. 
143. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case C-84/00, [2001] E.C.R. I-4553, ¶ 20 
(referencing “mandatory requirement of fairness of commercial transactions”). 
Occasionally, the Court uses other terms to designate mandatory requirements, such as 
“imperative requirements,” “overriding requirements of general public importance,” 
and “overriding requirement justifying a restriction on the free movement of goods.” 
Commission v. Italy (Trailers), Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 59 (referencing 
“imperative requirements”); Konsumentombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska) 
Förlag AB, Joined Cases, C-34–36/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3843, ¶ 2 (discussing “overriding 
requirements of general public importance”); Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-
und vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-3689, ¶ 
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are not closed, the list of “mandatory requirements” recognized 
to date includes the prevention of tax evasion,144 consumer 
protection,145 the prevention of unfair competition,146 the 
protection of the environment,147 the improvement of working 
conditions,148 the maintenance of press diversity,149 and the 
protection of fundamental rights.150 Although for many years the 
Court treated the “mandatory requirements” differently from the 
grounds of justification mentioned in article 36, today it appears 
to have tacitly reversed that position.151 
III. MICKELSSON AND TRAILERS 
A. The Facts 
Commission v. Italy (“Trailers”) concerned an indistinctly 
applicable prohibition in the Italian Highway Code on the towing 
of trailers by mopeds; this prohibition even applied to trailers 
specially designed to be towed by mopeds.152 The Commission 
sought a ruling to the effect that this measure infringed article 34 
TFEU. Owing to a quirk in the legislation, it applied only to 
mopeds registered in Italy, and those bearing number-plates 
from other countries were not subject to the ban. Although this 
 
18 (discussing an “overriding requirement justifying a restriction on the free movement 
of goods”). 
144. See Abbink, Case 134/83, [1984] E.C.R. 4097; Carciati, Case 823/79, [1980] 
E.C.R. 2773. 
145. See De Groot en Slot Allium BV v Ministre de l'Économie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie, Case C-147/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-245; Commission v. France, Case C-166/03, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-6535; Linhart & Biffl, Case C-99/01, [2002] E.C.R. I-9375; GB-INNO-BM 
v. Confédération du Commerce Luxembourgeois, Case C-362/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-667. 
146. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-51/94 [1995] E.C.R. I-3599; BV Industrie 
Diensten Groep v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, Case 6/81, [1982] E.C.R. 707. 
147. See Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, [2003] E.C.R. I-7929; 
PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, Case C-379/98, [2001] E.C.R. I-2099; Aher-
Waggon v. Germany, Case C-389/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-4473; Commission v. Belgium, Case 
C-2/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-4431; Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 
4607. 
148. See Oebel, Case 155/80, [1981] E.C.R. 3147. 
149. See Familiapress, [1997] E.C.R. I-3689. 
150. See Schmidberger v. Australia, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659. 
151. Peter Oliver & Stephen Enchelmaier, Free Movement of Goods: Recent 
Developments in the Case Law, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 649, 689 (2007). 
152. Commission v. Italy (Trailers), Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶¶ 1, 6–9. 
  
1452 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1423 
anomaly was mentioned in passing,153 it played no direct part in 
the proceedings. 
The facts of Mickelsson154 were that Sweden had enacted an 
indistinctly applicable ban on the use of “personal watercraft.” 
These devices, a form of motorized raft familiarly known as jet 
skis, were the subject of considerable controversy in Sweden, 
given that they are widely considered to be dangerous for wildlife 
and the environment.155 The ban did not apply to generally 
navigable waterways or to other waters designated by local 
authorities according to criteria laid down in the statute.156 The 
defendants in the main proceedings were prosecuted for 
infringing the prohibition.157 The alleged offense occurred only a 
few weeks after the adoption of the contested legislation, when 
no local authority had yet approved any waters for the use of jet 
skis.158 Consequently, at the material time they were subject to a 
total ban outside generally navigable waters. The Swedish court 
hearing the case made a reference for a preliminary ruling 
asking whether such legislation was compatible with article 34.159 
For reasons which will soon become evident, it is necessary 
to consider these cases, which were initially referred to two 
different five-judge Chambers, together. They will be treated in 
chronological order, episode by episode. 
B. October 2006: The First AG’s Opinion in Trailers 
The first episode occurred in October 2006 with the delivery 
of AG Léger’s opinion in the Trailers case.160 The case had been 
regarded as so unimportant that no hearing had been held.161 In 
 
153. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Trailers, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 58; 
Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Trailers [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 142. 
154. Åklagaren v. Mickelsson, Case C-142/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
155. Id. ¶ 3. 
156. Id. ¶¶ 10–13. 
157. Id. ¶ 14. 
158. Id. ¶ 25. 
159. Id. ¶ 16–23. The reference also contained a question on Council Directive 
94/25, 1994 O.J. L 164/15 (relating to recreational craft). The Court found that this 
directive did not preclude such national legislation. Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶¶ 
16–23. 
160. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Trailers, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-
519. 
161. Trailers, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 13. 
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a very brief opinion, the AG found against the defendant.162 
Moreover, he appeared to have no difficulty finding that this 
measure fell within the scope of article 34 TFEU, since he 
asserted that “it is undeniable that, by imposing a general and 
absolute prohibition on the towing of trailers by mopeds 
throughout Italian territory, the national rules at issue impede 
the free movement of goods and, in particular, that of trailers.”163 
He also rejected Italy’s contention that the contested rule was 
justified.164 
C. December 2006: AG Kokott’s Opinion in Mickelsson 
In contrast, AG Kokott in her opinion in Mickelsson 
proposed a wholly novel approach to the treatment of 
restrictions on the use of goods under article 34 TFEU.165 
Although such restrictions have long been recognized as 
being capable of constituting measures of equivalent effect, very 
few have come before the Court. It was always plain that 
measures governing the use of goods which discriminate on their 
face against imports are caught by article 34. As long ago as 
1966—even before that provision had become fully applicable—
the Commission issued Directive 66/683 requiring the Member 
States to abolish measures which partially or totally prohibit the 
use of an imported product, as they were contrary to what is now 
article 34.166 Not surprisingly, the Commission assessment was 
endorsed by the Court some years later.167 What is more, in 
Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha, an indistinctly applicable 
ban on the use of a certain chemical was held to fall foul of 
 
162. Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Trailers, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 58 
163. Id. ¶ 39. 
164. Id. ¶¶ 62, 67. 
165. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273. 
166. Commission Directive Eliminating All Differences Between the Treatment of 
National Products, No. 66/683, 220 J.O. 3748 (1966) (full text unavailable in English). 
This directive was based on article 33(7) of the original Treaty of Rome, a provision that 
was repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam. See Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and 
Certain Related Acts art. 6(20), 1997 O.J. C 340/1, at 59. 
167. See SA des Grandes Distilleries Peureux v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux de la 
Haute-Saône et du territoire de Belfort, Case 119/78, [1979] E.C.R. 97.  
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article 34.168 All these authorities are unremarkable and 
provoked little commentary. 
The AG set out to change all that. She saw a pressing need 
to address what she perceived as the problem posed by 
arrangements relating to use, which she defined as “rules 
governing how and where products may be used.”169 She then 
referred to two restrictions on use which, she intimated, should 
not be caught by article 34: a prohibition on driving cross-
country vehicles “off-road” in forests and speed limits on 
motorways.170 She then admitted that such measures might be 
regarded as falling outside the scope of article 34 on the basis 
that their effects on imports were “too uncertain and too 
indirect” (the Peralta principle);171 but “an argument against 
these criteria is that they are difficult to clarify and thus do not 
contribute to legal certainty.”172 
Since she found the existing mechanisms unsatisfactory, she 
decided to construct a wholly novel theory. In her view, 
arrangements relating to use are comparable to selling 
arrangements “in terms of their nature and the intensity of their 
effects on trade in goods.”173 She rested her analysis on two traits 
which, she believed, were common to both categories of 
measure: both affected the marketing of a product “only 
indirectly through their effects on the purchasing behaviour of 
consumers”;174 and selling arrangements and use arrangements 
were not generally intended to “regulate trade in goods between 
Member States.”175 In a similar vein, she maintained that “[t]he 
Swedish regulations are not product-related since they do not 
make use dependent . . . on personal watercraft meeting 
technical requirements . . . . The restriction on use does not 
therefore require any modifications to the personal watercraft 
themselves.”176  
 
168. See cases cited supra note 104; see also Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-
249/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-174, ¶¶ 25–27; Harpegnies, Case C-400/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-
5121, ¶ 30; Brandsma, Case C-293/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-3159, ¶ 6.  
169. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott , Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 44. 
170. Id. ¶ 45. 
171. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
172. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott , Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 46. 
173. Id. ¶ 52. 
174. Id. ¶ 53. 
175. Id. ¶ 54. 
176. Id. ¶ 57. 
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On the basis of this supposed analogy, she proposed the 
following test: 
National legislation which lays down arrangements for use 
for products does not constitute a measure having equivalent 
effect within the meaning of Article [34 TFEU] so long as it 
applies to all relevant traders operating within the national 
territory and so long as it affects in the same manner, in law 
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those 
from other Member States, and is not product-related. 
However, prohibitions on use or national legislation which 
permit only a marginal use for a product, in so far as they 
(virtually) prevent access to the market for the product, 
constitute measures having equivalent effect which are 
prohibited under Article [34 TFEU], unless they are justified 
under Article [36 TFEU] or by an imperative requirement.177 
She did not attempt to define the term “marginal use” or to give 
examples of measures which only permitted such use. In any 
case, a crucial step in her reasoning was the following assertion: 
It is for the national court to decide whether national rules 
prevent access to the market. In the present case there are 
several reasons to suggest that the Swedish rules prevent 
access to the market for personal watercraft. The provisions 
of the Swedish regulations lay down a prohibition on the use 
of personal watercraft with the sole exception of use on 
general navigable waterways—at least for the period until the 
county administrative boards have designated other waters 
for the use of personal watercraft.178 
Consequently, although she proposed to leave this question to 
the national court, she inclined to the view that the legislation in 
question constituted a total or near total prohibition on the use 
of these craft.179 In addition, she left open the question as to 
whether this measure discriminated against imports in law or in 
fact (a question which would only arise if her intuition on the 
previous question turned out to be unfounded).180  
As to justification, the measure might be justified on 
environmental grounds but, given that it laid down no deadline 
by which the local boards were to designate permitted waters, it 
 
177. Id. ¶ 87. 
178. Id. ¶ 68. 
179. Id. ¶¶ 67, 70. 
180. Id. ¶¶ 63–64. 
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appeared to be incompatible with the principle of 
proportionality for want of legal certainty. 
This opinion stands in stark contrast to that of AG Jacobs in 
Leclerc-Siplec: unlike the approach set out in that opinion it would 
cut down, not broaden, the scope of article 34 TFEU. 
Furthermore, whereas one of the objections voiced by the 
Advocate General in Leclerc-Siplec was that it made rigid 
distinctions between different categories of rules, the approach 
proposed by the Advocate General would have introduced a fresh 
distinction of this kind. While these points in themselves are 
obviously no cause for criticism, the opinion in Mickelsson is a 
source of serious concern. 
The flaw in the Advocate General’s reasoning, it is 
submitted, lies in her analogy between restrictions on use and 
selling arrangements—the premise on which her entire theory 
rested.181 Restrictions on use differ markedly from selling 
arrangements in their intensity. Unless its impact on imports is so 
“uncertain and indirect” as to be caught by the Peralta principle, 
virtually any restriction on use can be expected to constitute a 
more serious hindrance on imports than a restriction on Sunday 
trading or a requirement that spectacles be sold by opticians or 
that baby food be sold exclusively in pharmacies. The fact that 
both categories of measure take effect after importation is beside 
the point, as we noticed earlier in relation to Alfa Vita.182 
What is more, if the Advocate General’s view were accepted 
with respect to restrictions on use, then logically the same 
approach would have to be extended to restrictions on 
possession. Three major categories of measure—those relating to 
selling arrangements, restrictions on use, and restrictions on 
possession—would then be subject to a discrimination test. 
Surely, this would unduly narrow the scope of article 34. In 
addition, more “rigid distinctions” (to coin the term used by AG 
Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec) between different categories of measure 
would then be created than the Court had envisaged in Keck. 
 
181. Contra Thomas Horsley, Case Note, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 2001 (2009); 
Eleanor Spaventa, Leaving Keck Behind? The Free Movement of Goods after the Rulings in 
Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos, 34 EUR. L. REV. 914, 922–23 (2009). Both 
authors support this analogy. 
182. See supra notes 98–102. 
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Few would quibble with AG Kokott’s assertion that article 34 
ought not cover minor restrictions on use, such as speed limits 
for cars.183 Other restrictions of the same nature spring to mind, 
such as: a ban on commercial flights at night; a prohibition on 
using hand-held mobile phones while driving a motor vehicle; 
and bans on adolescents being served alcohol in restaurants or 
on using ultraviolet sun-beds. As mentioned earlier, she was 
surely right to point to the subjective and difficult nature of the 
Peralta principle.184 Nevertheless, the fact remains that this 
principle is inherent in Dassonville, the fons et origo of the entire 
body of case law on the scope of article 34. Despite its 
shortcomings, Peralta is a necessary element in the Court’s 
interpretation of that provision and it is here to stay. 
Consequently, if a minor restriction on use were ever to come 
before the Court—and none appears to have done so to date—
then the proper course would surely be to find that its impact on 
imports is “too indirect and too remote” to be caught by article 
34.185 Indeed, as we shall see, that is the very solution that the 
Court appears to have adopted in Mickelsson. 
More poignantly, there was no need to address this issue in 
Mickelsson at all. By the Advocate General’s own admission, the 
measure at issue in that case was, if anything, at the opposite end 
of the spectrum from minor restrictions on use of the kind we 
have just mentioned. Indeed, she took the view that, in all 
probability, the Swedish legislation amounted to a total or near-
total ban on personal watercraft. To cap it all, restrictions on use 
have never given rise to any particular difficulty.  
Surely, in the light of all these circumstances, it was 
inappropriate to propose a radical upheaval of the principles 
governing this area of the law at this stage. As I mentioned at the 
outset, Gordon had a keen sense of which points should, and 
which should not, be decided in a particular case. I cannot 
imagine that he would have advised the Court to embark on such 
a radical course in this case.186 
 
183. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Mickelsson, Case C-142/05, [2009] 
E.C.R. I-4273, ¶¶ 43, 45–46, 49. 
184. See id. ¶ 46; see also supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
185. See id. 
186. For criticism of the Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in Mickelsson, see Luis 
González Vaqué, La Ampliación de la Jurisprudencia “‘Keck y Mithouard” à las Modalidades de Uso: 
¿Un Peligro Immediate para el Mercado Interior? [The Enlargement of the “Kecky & Mithouard” Case to 
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D. March and May 2007: the Trailers Case Re-Opened 
The opinion in Mickelsson prompted the Chamber hearing 
Commission v. Italy to refer the case to the Grand Chamber, which 
re-opened the oral phase of the proceedings. Anomalously, 
however, Mickelsson itself remained before a five-judge Chamber 
without the oral phase of the proceedings being reopened. 
In Trailers, the Grand Chamber invited all the Member 
States to submit their observations on when restrictions on use 
fall under article 34 TFEU. Eight Member States intervened, and 
the hearing was held in May 2007. 
E. A Strange Interlude: Commission v. Portugal 
Bizarrely, another case relating to restrictions on use, 
Commission v. Portugal,187 slipped through almost unnoticed at the 
very time when Trailers and Mickelsson were the focus of attention 
and controversy. This case concerned indistinctly applicable 
Portuguese legislation prohibiting the affixing of tinted film on 
car windows, ostensibly to prevent crime. This case did not 
appear to cause any difficulty for AG Trstenjak: 
[T]here can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the contested 
prohibition . . . constitutes a measure having equivalent 
effect within the meaning of that definition. Even if such a 
prohibition is applicable without distinction and is thus not 
discriminatory in nature, it is essentially aimed towards and 
capable of hindering or even making impossible the 
marketing in Portugal of tinted film lawfully manufactured 
and/or marketed in another Member State or in a State 
signatory to the EEA Agreement.188 
She went on to dismiss Portugal’s argument as to 
justification and therefore found for the Commission.189 The five-
judge Chamber of the Court that was hearing the case (the Third 
Chamber) likewise upheld the Commission’s claim that the 
measure was in breach of article 34 TFEU.190 In particular, the 
Court observed that “potential customers, traders, or individuals 
 
the Methods of Use: An Immediate Danger to the Internal Market?, 11 REVISTA ARANZADI 5 (2008) 
(Spain). 
187. Commission v. Portugal, Case C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245. 
188. Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Portugal, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶ 38. 
189. Id. ¶¶ 46–57. 
190. See Portugal, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶ 48. 
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have practically no interest in buying [the products concerned] 
in the knowledge that affixing such film to the windscreen and 
windows alongside passenger seats in motor vehicles is 
prohibited.”191 
Few would question this ruling. Indeed, it merely underlines 
the obvious fact that restrictions on use can fall foul of article 34, 
even if they are indistinctly applicable. 
F. July 2008: The Second AG’s Opinion in Trailers 
Following the hearing, AG Bot, as successor to AG Léger, 
delivered his opinion. He began by lending his support to the 
criticism of Keck voiced by AG Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec and by AG 
Maduro in Alfa Vita, namely that Keck established inappropriate 
and artificial distinctions between different categories of 
measure.192 Next, he expressed his concern that Keck had created 
a divergence between the free movement of goods and the other 
three fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty (persons, 
services, and capital).193 
Nevertheless, like AG Maduro, he considered it 
inappropriate to abandon Keck.194 Equally, he explained in great 
detail why he could not support AG Kokott’s approach in 
Mickelsson. His reasons were essentially those set out above.195 
Indeed, in a particularly trenchant remark, he declared that he 
saw “no reason for departing from that analytical approach in 
favour of a solution which, ultimately, would to some extent 
render nugatory one of the key provisions of the Treaty.”196 
He then sang the praises of the “access to market” test. One 
advantage of this test, he maintained, was that it would enable 
the Court to bring the principles governing the free movement 
of goods closer to those applicable to the free movement of 
persons, services, and capital.197 He pointed out that this 
 
191. Id. ¶ 33. 
192. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Commission v. Italy (Trailers), Case C-
110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶¶ 79–81. 
193. Id. ¶ 82. In Alpine Invs. BV v. Ministerie van Financiën, the Court declined to 
transpose Keck to services; it has not transposed that ruling to the free movement of 
persons or the free movement of capital either. Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-1141. 
194. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Trailers [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 84. 
195. Id. ¶ 86. 
196. Id. ¶ 102. 
197. Id. ¶ 118. 
  
1460 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1423 
principle underlies all the case law on the definition of measures 
of equivalent effect under article 34 TFEU.198 In addition, he 
made it clear that the “access to market” test should not involve 
an appraisal of complex economic data.199 
As to the contested provision of the Italian Highway Code, 
he found that, as a total ban on use, it gave rise to “a substantial, 
direct and immediate obstacle to intra-Community trade” and it 
thus fell squarely within article 34 TFEU.200 Moreover, he gave 
short shrift to Italy’s defense that this provision was justified on 
road safety grounds: Italy had failed to furnish any precise 
evidence in support of its claim; the provision only applied to 
trailers towed by motorcycles registered in Italy; and finally, road 
safety could equally well have been ensured by other, less 
restrictive measures.201 For all these reasons, he advised the Court 
to uphold the Commission’s action. 
While the Advocate General’s findings in the instant case 
appear sound, it is submitted that, like AG Maduro in Alfa Vita, 
he attached excessive importance to the idea of a unitary 
approach to all four freedoms. Moreover, his espousal of the 
“access to the market” test is problematic, since he gave no 
indication of his conception of this nebulous term beyond his 
clear and most welcome rejection of a test entailing the appraisal 
of complex economic data. On one view, restrictions on “access 
to the market” are those which are “capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially”—so we are back to 
the Dassonville formula! Could this really be what AG Bot 
intended? Or did he mean a test such as that proposed by AG 
Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec, but shorn of its de minimis element? If 
not, then what?202 
 
198. Id. ¶ 128. 
199. Id. ¶ 116. 
200. Id. ¶ 159. 
201. Id. ¶¶ 169–70. 
202. On the ambiguity of “access to market” as a test, see Horsley, supra note 181, 
at 2014, and Spaventa, supra note 181, at 923. However, the test continues to have many 
distinguished advocates. See, e.g., BARNARD, supra note 89, at 162–65; Catherine Barnard 
& Scott Deakin, Market Access and Regulatory Competition, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE 
EUROPEAN MARKET 197 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002); Peter Pecho, 
Goodbye Keck? A Comment on the Remarkable Judgment in Commission v. Italy, C-110/05, 36 
LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 257 (2009); Luca Prete, Of Motorcycle Trailers and 
Personal Watercrafts: the Battle over Keck, 35 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 133 
(2008); Gert Straetmans, Market Access, The Outer Limits of Free Movement of Goods and the 
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G. February 2009: The Judgment in Trailers 
1. Principles Governing Article 34 
In February 2009—just shy of four years after the action in 
the case had been lodged—the Grand Chamber delivered its 
judgment in Trailers.203 Given the delay and the exceptional 
procedural steps taken by the Court, the ruling came as an 
anticlimax, not to say a disappointment. 
The Court opened its judgment with a series of “preliminary 
observations.” This section of the judgment opens with a 
reiteration of the principles laid down in Dassonville, Cassis de 
Dijon, and Keck.204 By this means, the Court implied that these 
principles are still good law. However, in paragraph 37 the Court 
then asserted: 
Consequently, measures adopted by a Member State the 
object or effect of which is to treat products coming from 
other Member States less favourably are to be regarded as 
measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
on imports within the meaning of Article [34 TFEU], as are 
the measures referred to in paragraph 35 of the present 
judgment. Any other measure which hinders access of 
products originating in other Member States to the market 
of a Member State is also covered by that concept.205 
Thus, despite confirming the three pillars of the previous case 
law (Cassis de Dijon, Dassonville, and Keck), the Court then appears 
to set out a fresh approach by spelling out three categories of 
measure of equivalent effect under article 34 TFEU, namely: (i) 
measures which discriminate against imports (measures “the 
object or effect of which is to treat products coming from other 
Member States less favourably”); (ii) rules that lay down 
requirements to be met by goods which have been “lawfully 
manufactured and marketed [in other Member States] . . . even 
if those rules apply to all products alike”; and (iii) “any other 
 
Law?, in VIEWS OF EUROPEAN LAW FROM THE MOUNTAIN: LIBER AMICORUM FOR PIET JAN 
SLOT 91 (Mielle Bulterman et al. eds., 2009);. But these authors do not necessarily share 
the same understanding of the concept. 
203. Trailers, Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519. 
204. Id. ¶¶ 33–36. 
205. Id ¶ 37. 
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measure which hinders access of products originating in other 
Member States.”206 
The first category is scarcely novel, although the reference 
to the object of measures is unusual, but not unprecedented.207 
The second category covers measures of the type in issue in Cassis 
de Dijon, although it also covers discriminatory measures. The 
first two categories will overlap in some cases. The real novelty 
comes with the third category—which the Court has not troubled 
to define at all! Nor has the Court made it clear whether only 
residual measures that are neither product-bound nor related to 
selling arrangements can fall within the third category; but the 
better view is that this category is limited to those measures.208 On 
one view, the Court is merely telling us that these residual 
measures are governed by the general Dassonville formula, not by 
the discrimination test applicable to measures relating to selling 
arrangements; but we knew that already. 
What is more, while it is notable that the Court has referred 
to “access to the market,” there is no evidence that it now intends 
to apply a pure market access test (i.e., a test involving a case-by-
case assessment without reference to any rules relating to 
particular types of measure)—any more than the mention of 
market access in paragraph 17 of the ruling in Keck was to be 
understood in this way.209 On the contrary, like AG Maduro in 
Alfa Vita and AG Bot in Trailers, the Court in this case appears to 
be keen to amend Keck, while retaining its essence—but without 
giving any indication as to how this is to be achieved. 
As already mentioned, the ruling in Keck has been fairly 
criticized for its poor drafting. Yet, if anything, the language of 
the judgment in Trailers is even more shrouded in mystery and 
ambiguity.210 At least in Keck, the Court had the commendable 
courage to state explicitly that it was reversing some of its 
 
206. Id. ¶¶ 34–35, 37. 
207. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The phrase “object or effect” is 
drawn from the case law on article 35 TFEU. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
208. See Fenger, supra note 105, at 333; Spaventa supra note 181, at 922. 
209. Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267–68/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶ 17. 
210. See Nicolas De Sadeleer, L’Examen, au Regard de l’Article 28 CE, des Règles 
Régissant les Modalités d’Utilisation de Certains Produits, 2009 JOURNAL DU DROIT EUROPÉEN 
247, 249 (Fr.); Spaventa, supra note 181, at 922. Even Pecho acknowledges that “its 
concrete meaning is . . . still to be determined.” Pecho, supra note 202, at 271. 
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previous case law;211 but the same cannot be said of the judgment 
in Trailers. Consequently, it is not even clear whether the Court is 
seeking to plot a new course: paragraph 37 can equally be read as 
a description of the existing case law, albeit an idiosyncratic 
one.212 The latter view appears to be supported by the fact that, in 
the judgments delivered since its rulings in Trailers, the Court has 
continued to apply its earlier approach to article 34.213 For this 
reason, it seems premature to conclude that this ruling has made 
any change at all in the pre-existing law.214 More probably, it 
should be seen as a harbinger of possible changes to come. 
2. Restrictions on Use 
Turning to the case at hand, the Court began by stating that 
the Commission had not specified whether its action was 
confined to trailers specifically designed to be towed by 
motorcycles or whether it also covered other trailers. Since the 
Commission had failed to establish that the contested provision 
of the Italian Highway Code hindered “access to the market” for 
the latter category, the Court dismissed the action to that 
extent.215 The rest of its judgment therefore relates exclusively to 
trailers specifically designed to be towed by motorcycles. The 
Court noted that, according to the evidence before it, such 
trailers could not effectively be put to any other use. Accordingly, 
it found: 
 
211. Keck & Mithouard, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 16–18. 
212. Commission v. Italy (Trailers), Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519. ¶ 37. 
213. Apart from Mickelsson, see, for example, Budĕjovický Budvar, Národní Podnik 
v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, Case C-478/07, [2009] E.C.R. __, [2009] E.T.M.R. 1238; 
Commission v. Spain, Case C-88/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1353; Fachband der Buch-und 
Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-531/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-
3717. 
214. Sibony and Defossez also consider that this passage of the Trailers judgment is 
not a reversal of the earlier case law, but merely a reformulation. Anne-Lise Sibony & 
Alexandre Defossez, Chronique Marché Intérieur [Internal Market Chronicle], 46 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 129, 143 (2010). On Spaventa’s view, this ruling 
clarifies “what, in many respects, was already evident from previous case law: the Keck 
distinction based on the type of rules is no longer relevant . . . . [It seems] to realign the 
case law on goods with the case law on the free movement of persons, so that barriers to 
economic freedom, to the freedom to trade, might now well be caught by Art. [34 
TFEU] . . . .” Spaventa, supra note 181, at 928–29.” In any case, for the reasons set out in 
Part III.A.4 of this Article, it seems most unlikely that the Court intended to go so far as 
to turn article 34 into a provision conferring freedom to trade. 
215. Trailers, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶¶ 49–53. 
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[A] prohibition on the use of a product in the territory of a 
Member State has a considerable influence on the behaviour 
of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access of that 
product to the market of that Member State. 
Consumers, knowing that they are not permitted to use their 
motorcycle with a trailer specially designed for it, have 
practically no interest in buying such a trailer. Thus, [the 
contested provision] prevents a demand from existing in the 
market at issue for such trailers and therefore hinders their 
importation.216 
With these clear words, the Court rejected the radical 
approach to restrictions on use propounded by the Advocate 
General in Mickelsson. This is most welcome. 
3. Justification 
Controversy also surrounds the ruling on whether the 
contested legislation was justified. The Court began this part of 
its judgment by noting Italy’s claim that this measure was justified 
on the grounds of road safety.217 As to whether the contested 
measure was necessary for this purpose, the Court stated: 
Although it is possible, in the present case, to envisage that 
measures other than the prohibition laid down in . . . the 
Highway Code could guarantee a certain level of road safety 
for the circulation of a combination composed of a 
motorcycle and a trailer . . . the fact remains that Member 
States cannot be denied the possibility of attaining an 
objective such as road safety by the introduction of general 
and simple rules which will be easily understood and applied 
by drivers and easily managed and supervised by the 
competent authorities.218 
Manifestly, this statement runs directly counter to the firmly 
established principle that the burden of proof is borne by the 
 
216. Id. ¶¶ 56–57 (citing Commission v. Portugal, Case C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-
2245, ¶ 33). 
217. This has been recognized as a mandatory requirement. See Commission v. 
Netherlands, Case C-297/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-7467, ¶ 77; Commission v. Portugal, Case 
C-265/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-2245, ¶ 38. It would have been preferable to treat accident 
prevention as subsumed within the public health exception spelled out in article 36, but 
nothing turns on this—since it now appears that the mandatory requirements are 
assimilated into the grounds of justification laid down in that provision. 
218. Trailers, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 67. 
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party claiming that a measure is justified.219 The Court’s express 
admission that road safety could equally well have been assured 
by other, less restrictive measures makes this inconsistency all the 
more glaring. Moreover, there could be no room for any 
suggestion that this principle is relaxed in the field of accident 
prevention, given that human life is at stake: in a number of 
recent cases in this area, the Member State was held to have 
failed to discharge its burden of proof.220 Indeed, in some of 
these cases the Court stated that “the reasons which may be 
invoked by a Member State by way of justification must be 
accompanied by appropriate evidence or by an analysis of the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure 
adopted by that State, and precise evidence enabling its arguments 
to be substantiated.”221 
De Sadeleer maintains that the Court chose to relax its 
standard of review because the contested measure was a 
restriction on use.222 However, there is no reason why this should 
be so. What is more, nothing in the judgment suggests this. On 
the contrary, the Court’s clear statement that bans on use 
constitute measures of equivalent effect should be taken as an 
indication that restrictions on use do not warrant special 
treatment. 
Admittedly, a difficulty arises where there is some reason to 
believe that a measure might be justified but the Member State 
fails to furnish appropriate evidence to support that proposition. 
This problem is more acute where human life is at stake. Is the 
Court to take a legalistic view and find against the Member State, 
simply because it has failed to defend itself adequately, even if 
lives might then be lost? Or is the Court to find for the Member 
State despite a lack of evidence to support its case? This dilemma 
is by no means new for the Court, since a very high proportion of 
cases concerning article 36 TFEU relate to public health, 
accident prevention, or both. 
 
219. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
220. See Commission v. Belgium, Case C-227/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-46, ¶¶ 63–64 (full 
text of case available only in French); Commission v. Belgium, Case C-254/05, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-4269, ¶¶ 36–37; Commission v. Netherlands, Case C-297/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-
7467, ¶¶ 78–79.  
221. Belgium, Case C-227/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-46 ¶ 63 (full text of case available only 
in French); Belgium, Case C-254/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-4749, ¶ 36. 
222. De Sadeleer, supra note 210, at 250. 
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As just indicated, hitherto the Court’s solution to this 
dilemma has always been precisely the opposite of what it 
adopted in this case. Naturally, where the Member State makes 
out a reasonably convincing case on justification, then the 
burden shifts once again to the other party (in infringement 
proceedings this will be the Commission).223 If the Member State 
fails to do that but the Court still entertains doubts about the 
Commission’s case, the Court can pose detailed questions to the 
Member State asking it to provide precise evidence. 
To conclude on this point, it is obviously true that legislation 
is by its very nature of general application and the legislator is in 
no position to provide for every conceivable situation in the 
minutest detail. Yet this problem is scarcely new, and can be 
accommodated perfectly well by the standard case law.224 
H. Final Episode: The Judgment in Mickelsson 
1. Restrictions on Use 
The final move came in June 2009 when the Second 
Chamber delivered its judgment in Mickelsson—more than four 
years after the reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the 
Swedish court and four months after the ruling in Trailers.225 
First, the Court referred to the definitions of measures of 
equivalent effect set out in Cassis de Dijon and in paragraph 37 of 
the Trailers judgment.226 Next, it repeated paragraphs 56 and 57 
of the latter judgment (quoted above).227 This led it to the key 
pronouncement in Mickelsson, which reads: 
[W]here the national regulations for the designation of 
navigable waters and waterways have the effect of preventing 
 
223. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case C-55/99, [2000] E.C.R. I-1149; 
Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 178/84, [1987] E.C.R. 1227. 
224. In its subsequent judgment in Commission v. France, which was rendered on 
January 28, 2010, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the contested prior 
authorization scheme was justified on public health grounds, saying that it was 
“systematic and untargeted.” Case C-333/08, ¶ 103 (ECJ Jan. 28, 2010) (not yet 
reported). The case concerned the sensitive subject of substances akin to food additives. 
Id. 
225. Åklagaren v. Mickelsson, Case C-142/05 [2009] E.C.R. I-4273; Commission v. 
Italy (Trailers), Case C-110/05, [2009] E.C.R. I-519.  
226. Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 24 (citing ; Trailers, [2009] E.C.R. I-519, ¶ 
37; Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1973] E.C.R. 649, ¶¶ 6, 14–15). 
227. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
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users of personal watercraft from using them for the specific 
and inherent purposes for which they were intended or of 
greatly restricting their use, which is for the national court to 
ascertain, such regulations have the effect of hindering the 
access to the domestic market in question for those goods 
and therefore constitute, save where there is a justification 
pursuant to Article [36 TFEU] or there are overriding public 
interest requirements, measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on imports prohibited by Article [30 
TFEU].228 
Consequently, restrictions on use are caught by article 34 
TFEU if they fall within one of the following categories: (1) total 
bans on use (as in Commission v. Portugal and Trailers);229 (2) 
measures which prevent goods from being used “for the specific 
and inherent purposes for which they were intended”; and (3) 
measures which “greatly restrict” the use of goods.230 
The last two criteria are not notable for their precision,231 
but perhaps it could not be otherwise. Following the Advocate 
General’s opinion in Mickelsson,232 the Court was left with little 
choice but to attempt to specify which categories of restrictions 
on use fall within article 34. By its very nature, this is no easy task. 
On what basis do restrictions on use outside these three 
categories fall outside the scope of article 34? Although the Court 
did not spell this out, the answer can only be that the impact of 
such measures on imports is too “uncertain and indirect” for 
them to constitute measures of equivalent effect. In other words, 
the Peralta principle—ironically, the very principle that AG 
Kokott was at such pains to avoid—applies. As she pointed out, 
the drawback of the remoteness test in Peralta is that it contains 
an element of uncertainty and subjectivity;233 but this test is an 
inescapable element in the rules governing the definition of 
measures of equivalent effect under article 34. In short, the 
Court decided the question on the basis of the pre-existing 
principles, although the Advocate General had firmly opposed 
doing so. 
 
228. Id. ¶ 28. 
229. See supra notes 191–216 and accompanying text.. 
230. Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 28. 
231. See De Sadeleer, supra note 210, at 248. 
232. Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 28. 
233. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273 ¶ 46. 
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2. Justification 
The Court then proceeded to consider whether legislation 
of the kind in question could be justified for the protection of 
the environment and of human, animal, and plant life, as the 
Swedish government claimed.234 For the most part, this final 
passage of the judgment was in line with the standard case law on 
article 36 TFEU. In particular, the Court recalled that, in 
references for preliminary rulings, it is not for the Court itself, 
but for the national courts, to decide the facts.235 Also, the Court 
implied that there was no per se objection to imposing a blanket 
ban on the use of personal watercraft, subject to dispensations 
granted by the competent authorities.236 However, this passage 
contains two statements which merit special mention. In 
particular, the Court held: 
The fact that measures to implement those regulations had 
not been adopted at a time when those regulations had only 
just entered into force ought not necessarily to affect the 
proportionality of those regulations in so far as the 
competent authority may not have had the necessary time to 
prepare the measures in question, a matter which falls to be 
determined by the national court.237 
This assertion is surprising. First, it is strongly arguable that 
the Swedish legislation should have allowed a sufficiently long 
transitional period to enable the authorities concerned to take 
the requisite decisions.238 Second, there was no need to prosecute 
anyone for breach of this legislation until the necessary 
implementing measures were in place. Individuals should not 
have to suffer the consequences of measures adopted with undue 
haste or of the inaction of public authorities—especially not in 
criminal proceedings. As in Trailers, the Court clearly felt the 
need to relax the standard case law on article 36. Why ? 
The second noteworthy statement in this part of the 
judgment reads: 
 
234. Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 30. 
235. Id. ¶ 40. 
236. Id. ¶ 36. 
237. Id. ¶ 42. 
238. See Commission v. Austria, Case C-320/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-9871, ¶ 90; 
Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft mbH v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-309/02, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-11,763, ¶¶ 80–81; Commission v. Germany, Case C-463/01, [2004] 
E.C.R. I-11,705, ¶¶ 79–80. 
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Furthermore, if the national court were to find that 
implementing measures were adopted within a reasonable 
time but after the material time of the events in the main 
proceedings and that those measures designate as navigable 
waters the waters in which the accused in the main 
proceedings used personal watercraft and consequently had 
proceedings brought against them, then, for the national 
regulations to remain proportionate and therefore justified 
in the light of the aim of protection of the environment, the 
accused would have to be allowed to rely on that designation; 
that is also dictated by the general principle of Community 
law of the retroactive application of the most favourable 
criminal law and the most lenient penalty.239 
This assertion is most welcome: the principle referred to in this 
passage (frequently known by its Latin name, lex mitior) is 
enshrined in article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.240 It is interesting that it has now been incorporated into 
the principle of proportionality under article 36 TFEU. 
V. SUGGESTED REFORM 
Beyond any doubt, the time is ripe for the Court to 
streamline and clarify the definition of measures of equivalent 
effect under article 34 TFEU. It is submitted that the definition 
may be summarized in the following propositions: 
(1) The underlying principle is that measures which restrict 
imports actually or potentially, directly or indirectly, are 
caught by this concept (Dassonville). This test involves an 
examination of the inherent characteristics of the measure 
and does not entail an economic or statistical analysis.  
(2) A measure falls outside the scope of article 34 if its 
impact on imports is manifestly too “uncertain and indirect” 
(Peralta). This is part and parcel of the Dassonville formula, 
not a separate rule. 
 
239. Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273, ¶ 43 (citation omitted). 
240. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 133, art. 49(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 
401 ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence . . . when it was committed. Nor 
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the 
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, 
the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable.") 
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(3) For all measures other than those relating to selling 
arrangements—whether or not they are “product-bound” 
measures, such as those listed in paragraph 15 of the 
judgment in Keck—no discrimination against imports need 
be shown. However, measures which do discriminate against 
imports automatically constitute measures of equivalent 
effect. 
(4) Only rules relating to selling arrangements are subject 
to a test of de jure or de facto discrimination. Such rules 
include: restrictions on when goods may be sold; restrictions 
on where or by whom they may be sold; price controls; and 
advertising restrictions (but see point 5 below). The 
requirement that such rules “apply to all affected traders 
operating within the national territory” of the Member State 
concerned241 has no place in this area of the law and should 
be expressly abandoned. The concept of de facto 
discrimination is to be interpreted broadly, but not all 
restrictions on imports fall within this concept. In any case, 
total bans on advertising are considered to be discriminatory 
per se. 
(5) In case of doubt, a measure is not to be regarded as 
relating to selling arrangements so that the general rule in 
point 3 above applies. 
No doubt, the reader would have preferred this summary to 
be far more succinct. Yet, the fact is that, given the enormous 
variety of measures which have come before the Court, this 
subject matter cannot be condensed into a single sound bite. 
Experience has shown that, while the Court took an inspired 
starting point with the Dassonville formula, much further 
elaboration was required. 
In any case, the approach proposed here is simpler than it 
may appear at first sight: all measures other than those relating to 
selling arrangements are subject only to points 1 and 2; and, in 
any case, those two points are merely two sides of the same coin. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the widespread criticism of many of the judgments 
relating to articles 34 to 36 TFEU (especially Keck), the fact 
remains that this is a remarkable body of case law characterized 
 
241. Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267–68/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, ¶ 16. 
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by a surprisingly high degree of legal certainty, given the large 
number of cases decided each year. Given that there have been 
several hundred judgments in this area of the law over the years, 
some inconsistencies are inevitable. Plainly, the time is ripe for 
the case law to be streamlined and clarified—a task which, by its 
very nature, must fall to the Grand Chamber. Unfortunately, with 
its Delphic pronouncement in Trailers, it failed to perform that 
task. Instead, it simply muddied the waters further.242 
What is more, these cases are scarcely a model of case 
management, since they are beset by two glaring procedural 
anomalies: the decision to refer Trailers to the Grand Chamber 
while leaving Mickelsson before the Second Chamber; and the fact 
that Commission v. Portugal was decided by the Third Chamber 
after Trailers was re-opened. 
The ambiguities in the Trailers judgment and the procedural 
anomalies just mentioned scarcely show the Court at its best. At 
all events, it is to be hoped that the Grand Chamber will take the 
earliest opportunity to bring clarity to its definition of measures 
of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports under 
article 34 TFEU. In the meantime, it is noticeable that, since its 
ruling in Trailers, the Court has applied its earlier approach to 
this issue.243 
 
242. Unfortunately, this judgment was matched by an equally inconclusive 
judgment of the Grand Chamber on the concept of measures of equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on exports under article 35 TFEU. See Gysbrechts & Santurel 
Inter BVBA, Case C-205/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9947, ¶ 40; see also Defossez, supra note 5; 
Stéphane Rodrigues, Chronique de Jurisprudence Communautaire—Marché Intérieur-
Marchandises, Services et Capitaux [Chronicle of Community Cases—Internal Market-Goods, 
Services and Capital], 44 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 217, 230 (2009) (Fr.). 
243. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case C-333/08, ¶¶ 74–80 (ECJ Jan. 28, 2010) 
(not yet reported) (food processing supplements); Budĕjovický Budvar, Národní Podnik 
v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, Case C-478/07, [2009] E.C.R. __, [2009] E.T.M.R. 1238; 
Commission v. Spain, Case C-88/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1353, (products based on medicinal 
herbs); Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH, Case C-531/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-3717 (imported books sold at a fixed price). 
